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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
LAND LAW 
Heather J. Wilson * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Extensive residential property is becoming a commodity which 
fewer and fewer Americans can afford.1 Growing urbanization, 
economic factors, and increasing commercial demands for land 
may soon render the United States a largely "landless" society.2 
Even among property owners, land use patterns are changing. 
Condominium complexes with common recreational facilities are 
becoming popular,3 as are housing units which share yard space.4 
Residential developments are no longer laid out in a grid like 
fashion; other configurations provide a greater sense of roominess 
while using less space.5 These methods of reallocating limited land 
resources indicate that the presence of open space and the avail-
ability of undeveloped land for recreational purposes are impor-
tant social needs, and that people may be willing to sacrifice the 
right of exclusive ownership in order to obtain access to such land. 
The pervasiveness and strength of the general public's demand 
for access to undeveloped land is evidenced by statisticians' re-
liance on the amount of acreage which cities devote to general 
* Staff member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, § 3, at 20, col. 3; A House Is Not a Home, AM. 
DEMOGRAPIllCS, Feb. 1982, at 9; Morrow, Downsizing an American Dream, TIME, Oct. 5, 
1981 at 95; Thorton, Why So Many Families Are Doubling Up, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Mar. 9, 1981, at 53. 
2. See, e.g., Kloppenburg, The Demand for Land, AM. DEMOGRAPlllCS, Jan. 1983, at 34; 
Fulton,Are We Solving the Commuting Problem?, AM. DEMOGRAPIllCS, Nov. 1983, at 17, 
18-19,47-48; King, Action Is Sought To Help Protect U.S. Farmlands, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 
1981, at 20, col. 1. 
3. Edgerton, Housing You Can Afford, MONEY, May 1981 at 42, 48-49. 
4. Stokes, The Shrinking House of the Future, THE FUTURIST, Feb. 1982 at 49, 50-51. 
5. Guenther, Home Builders Try New Ways to Make Small Seem Bigger, Wall St. J., 
April 20, 1983 at 33, col. 1. 
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public use as a criterion for judging the quality of life in modern 
urban areas.6 
Individuals who own little or no land must rely on the govern-
ment to satisfy their need for open space. These members of the 
public have a strong interest in maintaining access to land which 
has been made available to them. Do they, however, have any 
claim of right to such land based upon its public importance and 
their continued use of it? Property law offers several mechanisms 
by which one may obtain rights in the land of another.7 Some of 
these techniques, however, carry onerous requirements concern-
ing the nature or the length of the public use, and others concern 
themselves with evaluating the actions or intent of the land's 
titular owner rather than the strength of the public's need and 
the social importance of the uses to which the public puts the 
land. 
Nevertheless, there is a common-law rule which safeguards the 
public's right to use publicly owned land for socially valuable 
activities. This principle is the doctrine of public trust. The public 
trust doctrine originated under Roman law in order to grant the 
public unrestricted access to both the sea and the seashore. The 
ancient doctrine accomplished its aim by declaring that the 
sovereign state held the sea bed and the land affected by the tides 
in trust for the benefit of the public. This notion permitted the 
public to use the ocean and the seashore for any noninjurious 
purpose. The public trust doctrine was later adopted into English 
common law and consequently came to the American colonies, 
including M~ssachusetts. 
Because of Massachusetts' coastal location and its citizens' his-
torical dependence upon the sea, public trust has traditionally 
helped shape the use of the state's aquatic resources, and it 
continues to serve that valuable function today. The public's need 
for access to undeveloped land, however, is becoming as great as 
its need for access to the sea. This fact highlights the importance 
of applying the public trust doctrine to inland areas. The Massa-
chusetts judiciary has recognized the need to protect public use of 
government-owned land. Although it has never explicitly ex-
tended the public trust doctrine to inland areas, it nevertheless 
has injected public trust concepts into land use law. 
6. R. BOYER & D. SAVAGEAU, PLACES RATED ALMANAC, 236-237 (1981). See also T. 
BOWMAN, G. GIULIANI, & M.R. MINGE, FINDING YOUR BEST PLACE TO LIVE IN AMERICA 
(1981). 
7. See infra notes 123-27. 
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Massachusetts courts have implemented the essential ideas of 
public trust through several legal mechanisms. The foremost of 
these is a principle of eminent domain law called the doctrine of 
prior public use. This doctrine requires state agencies, munici-
palities, and other governmental entities to obtain legislative 
authorization before altering the existing use of public land. No 
existing land use doctrine, however, adequately protects the pub-
lic's interest in land which is made publicly available, but which is 
actually held by an organ of the state in its proprietary capacity. 
Using Massachusetts as an example, this article will examine 
how public trust principles have been extended to protect public 
access to inland areas. First, it will outline the history and devel-
opment of the public trust doctrine, concluding with a description 
of how the doctrine is currently applied to submerged lands in 
Massachusetts. Second, it will consider public trust's applicability 
to undeveloped public land and the desirability of using the doc-
trine to protect such areas. Third, it will explore in some detail 
how Massachusetts has already incorporated public trust princi-
ples into its land use law. Finally, the article will analyze the 
sufficiency of Massachusetts' approach to protecting its undevel-
oped public lands. It will also point out one situation in which 
legislative action may be required to defend fully the public's 
interest in maintaining access to open land. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLJC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The notion of a sovereign state holding land in trust for its 
people developed under Roman law, in which the doctrine was 
applied only to the bed of the sea and the area washed by the 
tides. Although the doctrine has been expanded somewhat in the 
United States, many courts and commentators still consider its 
applicability to be limited primarily to submerged lands and their 
banks or shores.s In order to isolate the central purpose of the 
public trust doctrine, one must therefore look to both its aquatic 
heritage and its continuing role in the development of coastal law 
in the individual states, of which Massachusetts is an example. 
A. Origins and Histoncal Development of Public Trust 
For thousands of years, people have depended upon the sea as a 
source of food and a means of transportation. The satisfaction of 
8. E.g., Note, The Public Trust Doctrine and Ownership of Florida's Navigable Lakes, 
29 U. FLA. L. REV. 730 (1977). 
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basic physical and social needs necessitated a policy of free public 
access to the sea among early organized societies. To Roman 
minds, the need for such a social policy also required the formula-
tion of a legal justification for the exemption of the sea and its 
coastline from the principles of private property law.9 The legal 
underpinning which the Romans developed for this social neces-
sity was the doctrine of public trust.1O Not only was the doctrine a 
central part of Roman water law, but it continued to play an 
important role in the law of those countries which made Roman 
practices the basis of their legal systems, such as England, 
France, and Spain.ll This article, however, will confine its discus-
sion of history to England's treatment of the public trust doctrine, 
since it is English legal principles which most American states, 
including Massachusetts, adopted as the foundation of their 
common law. 
Over the centuries, the scope of the public trust doctrine has 
been contracted and expanded by lawmakers to reflect both 
changing public demand for access to coastal and inland water-
ways, and shifting public use of these natural resources. The 
course of the doctrine's evolution, however, demonstrates that it 
is the satisfaction of public needs, and not the protection of 
natural resources, which is at the heart of public trust. 
1. Roman Law 
Under Roman law, the state's sovereignty extended over the 
foreshore.12 This land, however, was considered the people's com-
9. See W. BUCKLAND, A TExTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 
180-186 (2d ed. 1932); R.W. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 108-10 (4th ed. 1956); 
W.A. HUNTER, ROMAN LAW 309-10 (3d ed. 1897). 
10. See H. SCHULTES, AQUATIC RIGHTS 5 (1811). 
11. H. ALTHAUS, PuBUC TRUST RIGHTS, 10-23 (1978). 
12. The foreshore is a comprehensive term generally used to refer to both the bed of 
the sea and the land over which the tide flows. Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A 
Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 n.1 (1970) [hereinafter cited 
as Tidal Areas] This latter area is often called the shore, the tidelands, or the flats. 
Various legal systems have defined its upper boundary differently. Under Roman law it 
extended to "the limit of the highest winter f1ood",id. at 783 n.83 (quoting INST. JUST. 
2.1.1 pro (4th ed. J.B. Moyle trans!. 1889», and under Hawaiian law to the upper annual 
reaches of the waves, excluding storm and tidal waves, as indicated by vegetation and 
debris. Application of Sanborn, 57 Hawaii 585, 588, 562 P.2d 771, 773 (1H77). English 
common law restricted its upper limit to the "ordinary" high water mark, M. HALE, DE 
JURE MARIS (1786), quoted in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894), which was defined 
as the point at which the action of the waves ceased to disturb upland soil and vegeta-
tion. P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN § 5.33 [4] (1982). See also, Corker, 
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mon property, of which the state was merely trustee.13 Therefore, 
the government could exercise its sovereign powers only in a 
regulatory capacity.14 According to Roman jurisprudence, 
"natural law" dictated that the "air, running water, the sea, and 
consequently the seashore were common to all",15 and no one 
could be denied access to the seashore, as long as he or she 
refrained from injuring improvements made upon it.16 Although 
Roman writers discuss particular activities which were permitted 
upon the seashore, such as "fishing, navigating and taking wa-
ter",17 drying nets or building a cottage "for purposes ofretreat"18 
this list seems to be merely indicative of common, appropriate 
uses rather than an enumeration of all permissible activities.19 
The concept of common ownership of the foreshore may have 
developed simply because the ocean did not lend itself to exclu-
sive, private ownership,20 and could not be efficiently exploited by 
individuals.21 It may also have been that private ownership of the 
foreshore would have endangered the welfare of the whole soci-
ety, considering Roman society's heavy dependence on the sea for 
maintaining its widespread commercial networks and providing 
food for those who lived near its shores.22 Although both factors 
may have been important in bringing about communal ownership 
of the tidal areas, the latter was probably more influential. As one 
commentator has noted, "over the centuries, the extent to which 
the public's interests have been recognized in the law has corre-
lated directly with changes in the ratio of the demand to the 
supply of tidal resources".23 
Where Does the Beach Begin and to what Extent is that a Federal Question, 42 WASH. L. 
REV. 33, 43-54 (1966). 
13. Tidal Areas, supra note 12, at 772 n. 43. 
14. H. ScHULTES, supra note 10, at 2. 
15. INST. JUST. 2.1.1 pr., quoted in id. at 763. 
16. INST. JUST. 2.1.1-2.1.6 pr., quoted in Tidal Areas, supra note 12, at 763-64. "Im-
provements" are defined as "habitations, monuments, and buildings" in INST. JUST., (T. 
Sanders trans. 4th ed. 1867). 
17. H. SCHULTES, supra note 10, at 2, cittnQ HERODIAN LIB. 2, cap. 15, quoted in Tidal 
Areas, supra note 12, at 763 n.7. 
18. INST. JUST., 2.1.1-2.1.6 pr., quoted in Tidal Areas, supra note 12, at 764. 
19. R.W. LEE, supra note 9, at 109, quoted in Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970). 
20. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1,71 (1821). See also Sax, Liberating the Public Trust 
Doctrinefrom Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 185,186 n.6. (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Sax, Shackles]. 
21. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). 
22. See generally, Tidal Areas, supra note 12, at 763-64, 772-74. 
23. Id. at 771-73. 
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2. English Law 
At some point before or during the Norman reign (1066-1154), 
the English king claimed a private interest in the land beneath 
the sea, and made grants of this land to individual subjects.24 
Publicly available shoreline remained adequate until about the 
time of Magna Charta (1215), when an urgent need for reform was 
perceived, and the law began a trend back toward recognition of 
public rights in the seashore.25 Although the precise effect of 
Magna Charta is unclear,26 it is agreed that after Magna Charta, 
the king held two interests in the foreshore: the jus privatum and 
the jus publicum.27 The jus privatum was the proprietary interest 
in the foreshore which the sovereign had previously possessed. 
This interest, however, was subordinated to the jus publicum, an 
interest which the king henceforth held in his capacity as rep-
resentative of the people, for the protection of their common 
fishing and navigational rights.28 The king could still convey his 
proprietary interest in land, but after Magna Charta, such land 
remained subject to the jus publicum which could be alienated 
only by an act of Parliament.29 
The introduction of the jus publicum saved the public's right of 
access to the sea from total elimination at the hands of the king. 
The large areas of the foreshore, however, which, prior to Magna 
Charta, had been granted by generations of kings to private 
individuals, necessitated restricting the public's interest in the 
24. 1 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 166-67 (1904). Commen-
tators disagree about when these events occurred. Compare Tidal Areas, .~upra note 12, 
at 765 with D. RICE, FINAL REPORT: A STUDY OF THE LAW PERTAINING TO THE TIDE-
LANDS OF MASSACHUSETTS, H.R. Doc. No. 4932, 18 (1971). 
25. Tidal Areas, supra note 12, at 765. 
26. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); D. RICE, supra note 24, at 18. 
27. 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 24 at 167-68; R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CROWN AND THE PRIvILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE REALM, 43 
n.(v) (2d ed. 1875). 
28. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 458 
(1892). 
29. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 382 (1926); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 
Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 83 (1851). See also Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-12 (1842). 
As Sir Matthew Hale explained it: 
[T]he jus privatum of the owner or proprietor is charged with, and subject to, 
that jus publicum which belongs to the king's subjects; as the soil of a highway 
is, which though in point of property it may be a private man's freehold, yet it is 
charged with a public interest of the people which may not be prejudiced or 
damnified. 
M. HALE, DE JURE MARIS (1786), quoted in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894). 
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sea to easements30 permitting only fishing and navigation.31 Thus, 
Magna Charta did not give Britons the extensive rights to tidal 
lands possessed by their Roman predecessors, but it did allow 
them to pursue those water-related activities most vital to a 
pre-industrial society. 
3. American Law 
Under their royal charters, the American colonies were given 
the king's title to both the jus publicum and the jus privatum, as 
well as Parliament's rights of regulation. After the Revolution, 
these interests passed to the newly formed states.32 As other 
states entered the Union, they too became entitled to the land 
under their navigable33 waters, subject to the public trust.34 Be-
cause the states have the power to administer their trust lands as 
they see fit, the public trust doctrine has always been considered 
exclusively a doctrine of state law,35 at least with respect to state 
owned land.36 
In 1892, an Illinois case gave the Supreme Court of the United 
States an opportunity to consider public trust's applicability to 
inland bodies of water. This case, Illinois Central Railroad v. 
Illinois,37 has been called the "lodestar"38 of American public trust 
law. At issue in the case was a grant of approximately one thou-
sand acres under Lake Michigan, made by the Illinois legislature 
to the Illinois Central Railroad. This block of submerged land 
encompassed virtually the entire commercial waterfront of the 
city of Chicago. Four years after making the conveyance, the 
30. "An easement is a right to use another's land for special purposes not inconsistent 
with the general property interest which the land owner retains." 2 G. THOMPSON, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 315, at 2-3 (1980). 
31. Tidal Areas, supra note 12, at 770. 
32. Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 426, 89 N.E. 124, 125 
(1909). See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845). 
33. American courts have expanded the English common law definition of "naviga-
ble." See infra text at notes 42-47. 
34. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 
(1894). 
35. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,56,57-58 (1894); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394 
(1876). 
36. The federal government may be considered a trustee of federally owned, public 
land. See Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 269 
(1980). 
37. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
38. Sax, supra note 19, at 489. 
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legislature regretted its action, repealed the grant, and brought 
suit to have it declared void. The United States Supreme Court 
held that the original grant was invalid, because the legislature 
did not have the power to put such a large block of public trust 
land forever beyond its contro1.39 Although the Court in Illinois 
Central was interpreting Illinois public trust law, rather than 
creating a precedent binding on the states40 or establishing a 
distinct, federal public trust law,41 it is nonetheless an important 
statement concerning the purposes of the public trust doctrine 
and the flexibility with which it should be applied. 
In reaching its decision, the Court expanded the scope of the 
public trust doctrine. The Court recognized that although English 
law considered all navigable waterways subject to the public 
39. The Court stated: 
The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be 
discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has 
an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of 
the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such 
parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be 
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the 
lands and waters remaining ... The State can no more abdicate its trust over 
property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and 
soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of 
private parties ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of 
government and the preservation of the peace . . . [PJroperty of a special 
character, like lands under navigable waters, ... cannot be placed entirely 
beyond the direction and control of the State . 
. . . We hold, therefore, that any attempted cession of the ownership and 
control of the State in and over the submerged lands in Lake Michigan ... was 
inoperative 
... There can be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance of property by a 
grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was bound to hold and 
manage it. 
146 U.S. at 453-60. This language has been widely quoted by courts and commentators 
who favor its proposition as an authoritative statement of any state legislature's ability 
to alienate its submerged lands. See, e.g., Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Common-
wealth, 378 Mass. 629, 647, 393 N.E.2d. 356,366 (1979), discussed infra text at notes 78-88; 
Sax, supra note 19 at 489-91. However, the Court's decision in Illinois Central was based 
upon its interpretation of Illinois law. Thus, its statements regarding the inalienability 
of certain public trust lands are binding only upon Illinois. See Fox River Paper Co. v. 
R.R. Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,56 (1894); Barney v. 
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394 (1876); Neptune 
City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 308-09, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (1972). See also Nelson, State 
Disposition of Submerged Lands Versus Public Rights in Navigable Waters, 3 NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 491, 498-499 (1970); Note, Lyon & Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of 
the Public Trust, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1138, 1143-1145 (1982). 
40. See supra text at note 35. 
41. See Wilkinson, supra note 36, at 273-74. 
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trust, the doctrine's applicability in England was nevertheless 
limited to coastal areas. This was so because Britain's navigable 
waters were almost all affected by the action of the tides,42 and 
English jurists found it convenient to make the ebb and flow of 
the tide the legal test of navigability.43 In an earlier case, the 
Supreme Court had realized that such a definition of navigability 
was inappropriate in the United States, where many bodies of 
water unaffected by the tide were, in fact, navigable.44 Therefore, 
it had altered the English concept of navigability to match the 
characteristics of the new continent.45 The Illinois Central court 
recognized this previous change. It concluded that navigability 
should remain the test of whether submerged land was imbued 
with the public trust, but that navigability should be defined in 
terms of actual navigability,46 without any reference to the tide's 
ebb and flow. "The [public trust] doctrine is founded upon the 
necessity of preserving to the public the use of navigable waters 
from private interruption and encroachment, a reason as applica-
ble to navigable fresh waters as to waters moved by the tide."47 
By noting with approval the American expansion of the cate-
gory of lands covered by the doctrine, the Court implicitly 
cautioned against recognizing the public trust only in land pos-
sessing the same physical features as land traditionally subject to 
the trust. The Court realized that it is the social value of the uses 
to which the public has put the land, rather than the nature of the 
land itself, which determines the existence of public trust.48 It 
tacitly acknowledged that in identifying public trust land, there is 
no dependable shortcut for ferreting out the land's functional role, 
42. 146 U.S. at 435. 
43. I d. at 435-36. See also Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative 
Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 195, 201-02 (1980). 
44. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454 (1851). 
45. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 455 (1851), cited in Illinois 
Cent. R.R. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 435-36 (1892). 
46. Framing a definition of "navigability in fact" is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, it is often defined in terms of suitability for boating and the floating of logs. 2 P. 
NICHOLS, supra note 12, at § 5.30 [1] (1982). See generally MacGrady, The Navigability 
Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and 
Some Doctrines that Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 513 (1975). 
47. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892). See also Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 
324, 336 (1876). It must be remembered, however, that navigability is not always coex-
tensive with public ownership today. The ownership of navigable waters within its 
boundaries passed to each state as it entered the Union (see supra text at notes 32-34), 
but many states have seen fit to place the title to their submerged riparian lands in 
private hands. 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 12, at § 5.30 [1]. 
48'1 See 146 U.S. at 458. 
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which may be defined as the presence or absence of public uses 
vital to the livelihood or welfare of the citizenry. 
Illinois Central highlighted the purposes of the public trust 
doctrine and demonstrated how that purpose gives the doctrine 
flexibility with respect not only to the types of land to which it 
may apply, but also to the types of public uses which it may 
protect. In discussing the importance of public access to the wa-
ters of Lake Michigan, the Court mentioned the time-honored 
public uses of fishing and navigation, but it particularly em-
phasized the value of commerce.49 This emphasis undoubtedly 
reflected the priorities of the people of a city located on an im-
mense body of water, at what was perhaps the height of the 
industrial revolution. By phrasing its rationale in terms of com-
merce rather than in terms of other uses, which were both more 
traditional and probably more widely practiced in bodies of fresh 
water, the Court indicated that the public uses protected by the 
doctrine may vary according to both the changing needs of the 
public and the activities to which the natural characteristics of 
the particular waterway, such as its size and depth, make it most 
amenable. "[T]he bed or soil of navigable waters is held by the 
people of the State in their character as sovereign in trust for 
public uses for which they are adapted."oo Thus, the Court ac-
knowledged that the public's use of Lake Michigan was not lim-
ited to those activities which it had enumerated in its decision. 
Through its dicta,S1 Illinois Central emphasized the flexibility 
with which the public trust doctrine should be interpreted, and 
thus set the tone for its further development by the individual 
states. 
4. Massachusetts Law 
Massachusetts lawmakers, like the United States Supreme 
Court in Illinois Central, have long recognized that the public 
trust doctrine should be given flexibility with regard to the types 
of submerged lands to which it applies and the public uses which 
it protects. More than a century before Massachusetts achieved 
statehood, the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
moved to secure public access to the colony's many small freshwa-
49. Id. at 452, 454. 
50. Id. at 457-58 (emphasis supplied). 
51. See supra note 39. 
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ter lakes, called Great Ponds.52 The Ordinance of 1641-47, which is 
now considered part of Massachusetts' common law,53 prohibited 
towns from granting ponds larger than ten acres to private indi-
viduals, and required that such ponds be made available for pub-
lic use.54 Although the Ordinance enumerated only the rights of 
"fishing and fowling," the Supreme Judicial Court has liberally 
interpreted its provisions to permit virtually any use of a Great 
Pond which satisfies a public need.55 
Despite the harmony between Massachusetts law and Illinois 
Central regarding the public trust doctrine's flexibility, the state's 
52. Great Ponds are statutorily defined as those ponds "containing in their natural 
state more than ten acres ofland." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91 § 35 (West 1969). But 
see MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.131 § 1 (West 1974) (defining Great Pond as a natural pond 
of twenty or more acres). 
53. See, e.g., Barry v. Grela, 372 Mass. 278, 361 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Opinion of the 
Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement 
Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961). 
54. The Ordinance of 1641-47 states in pertinent part: 
Everie Inhabitant who is a hous-holder shall have free fishing and fowling, in 
any great Ponds, Bayes, Coves and Rivers, so far as the Sea ebs and flows, 
within the precincts of the town where they dwell, unles the Free-men of the 
same town, or the General Court, have otherwise appropriated them. Provided 
that no town shall appropriate to any particular person or persons, any great 
Pond conteining more than ten acres of land ... And for great Ponds lying in 
common, though within the bounds of some town, it shall be free for any man to 
fish and fowl there, and may passe and repasse on foot through any man's 
proprietie for that end, so they trespasse not upon any mans corn or meadow. 
THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWS AND LmERTYES 35 (1648), reprinted in THE LAWS 
AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETl'S (Harvard University Press ed. 1929) [hereinafter 
cited as GENERAL LA WEB]. 
The reasons generally given for the passage of this early law are the colonists' common 
need for the fish and game which the ponds supported, and the settlers' resentment of 
the harsh poaching laws under which they had suffered in England. Smith, The Great 
Pond Ordinance-Collectivism in Northern New England, 30 B.U.L. REV. 178, 179 
(1950); West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allan) 158, 165 (1863). 
55. In West Roxbury v. Stoddard, the court stated: 
We think it clear that by this Ordinance it was intended to devote the great 
ponds to public use ... The right of all persons to resort to them for fishing and 
fowling, the only use which the time would seem to have been considered of 
appreciable value, was explicitly secured .... It would scarcely be necessary to 
mention bathing, or the use of the water for washing, or watering cattle, 
preparation of flax, or other agricultural uses, to all which uses a large body of 
water, devoted to public enjoyment, would usually be applied .... With the 
growth of the community and its progress in the arts, these public reservations, 
at first set apart with reference to certain special uses only, became capable of 
many others which are within the design and intent of the original appropria-
tion. The devotion to public use is sufficiently broad to include them all, as they 
arise. 
89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158, 166-67. 
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judiciary has ignored Illinois Central's proclamation that a state 
may not completely abdicate its responsibility to maintain public 
trust lands for public purposes.56 Massachusetts courts have 
never, until recently,57 questioned the power of the legislature to 
transfer public trust property into private hands. In the 1904 case 
of Commonwealth v. Boston Terminal CO.,58 the Supreme Judicial 
Court acknowledged that the various states differ in their opin-
ions on a state's right to divest itself of its public trusteeship, but 
it noted that Massachusetts common law had never recognized 
any limitation on the legislature's power to alienate public trust 
land.59 In fact, the Massachusetts Bay Colony alienated some of 
its public trust land in the very same Ordinance in which it 
guaranteed public access to Great Ponds. The early settlers 
realized that the growth of commerce and industry in their com-
munity depended upon creating private incentives for the con-
struction of wharves which the Colony could not afford to erect.60 
The General Court therefore extended the title of waterfront 
owners to the line of extreme low tide or to 100 rods (1650 feet) 
from the mean high water mark, whichever was the lesser. The 
Ordinance, however, specifically reserved to the public the rights 
of fishing, fowling and navigation.61 
56. See supra note 39. 
57. See infra text at notes 78-88, 100-04. 
58. 185 Mass. 281, 70 N.E. 125 (1904). 
59. Id. at 283, 70 N.E. at 126. The court elaborated on this point saying, "the sovereign 
power, having the absolute right to terminate the trust which is appurtenant to its 
ownership, can refuse to act longer as trustee, and convey its property, so that the 
grantee will hold it free from the trust." Id. 
60. E.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1894); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 635, 393 N.E.2d 356, 360 (1979) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 180, 183-84 (1822»; Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 
Gray) 451, 514-15 (1857); Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810). 
61. The Ordinance of 1641-47 states in pertinent part: 
Everie Inhabitant who is a hous-holder shall have free fishing and fowling, in 
any great Ponds, Bayes, Coves and Rivers, so far as the Sea ebs and flows, 
within the precincts of the town where they dwell ... It is declared that, in all 
creeks, coves, and other places, about and upon salt water, where the Sea ebs 
and flows, the Proprietor of the land adjoyning, shall have proprietie to the low 
water mark where the Sea doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more 
wheresoever it ebs farther. Provided that such Proprietor shall not by this 
libertie have power to stop or hinder the passage of boats or other vessels in, or 
through any sea creeks, or coves or other mens houses or lands. 
GENERAL LAWES, supra note 54, at 35. For lengthier discussions of the Ordinance and 
its effect on the law of the Massachusetts coastline, see also M. FRANKEL, LAW OF 
SEASHORE WATERS AND WATER COURSES: MAINE AND MASSACHUSETTS (1979); J. 
WlllTTLESLEY, LAW OF THE SEASHORE, TmEW A TERS AND GREAT PONDS IN MASSACHU-
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While the history of the Ordinance has been detailed in count-
less cases,62 some modern commentators have implied that this 
ancient law is obsolete, and is kept alive by modern courts merely 
to effectuate a policy of restrictive public access to the state's 
beaches.63 Thus, its significance in the scheme of public trust law 
has been largely ignored. Although the source of the General 
Court's authority to enact the Ordinance is not entirely clear,64 
the Ordinance is, nevertheless, a good example of the flexibility of 
public trust principles. Aware of the conflicting needs of the public 
for the rapid development of shipping facilities and for the unre-
stricted use of the sea as a source of food and a means of transpor-
tation, the General Court reconciled those interests by alienating 
only as much of the tidelands as was necessary for wharf-
building. The early colonists plainly recognized that the doctrine 
of public trust is intended to satisfy public needs rather than block 
their fulfillment, and that the doctrine protects primarily the 
public use, and only incidentally the natural resource, on which 
the public use depends. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has consistently construed the 
Ordinance as granting littoral owners65 a fee66 in the land to 
which it applies,67 and has stolidly refused to expand the category 
of public rights in the privately-owned flats beyond those enu-
merated in the Ordinance; namely, fishing, fowling, and naviga-
tion.68 At least one commentator has called this judicial stance a 
SE'ITS AND MAINE (1932); D. RICE, supra note 24; Graber, Law of the Coast in a 
Clamshell-Part VI: The Massachusetts Approach, SHORE AND BEACH, Jan. 1982 at 13. 
62. See cases cited supra note 60 and cases cited by authorities listed supra note 61. 
63. See, e.g., Graber, supra note 61, at 15; Comment, Who Owns the Beach? Massachu-
setts Refuses to Join the Trend of Increasing Public Access, 2 URB. L. ANN. 283 (1976). 
64. There is some question as to whether the grant from Charles I to the Company of 
Massachusetts, under which the Massachusetts Bay Colony was founded, conferred on 
the Colony's General Court the power to make such a conveyance of tidelands. D. RICE, 
supra note 24, at 20-21; Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451, 516-17 (1857). 
65. Littoral owners are those holding title to land along the shore. Riparian owners, on 
the other hand, possess the banks of inland bodies of water. 
66. A fee (also called a fee simple or a fee simple absolute) is "the largest estate known 
to the law: it denotes ... the greatest possible aggregate of rights, powers, privileges, and 
immunities which a person may have in land." C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 29 (1962). 
67. Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 685-686, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (1974) and cases 
cited therein. The upland owner was free to enclose, fill, or build upon the flats adjoining 
his land and thereafter exclude the public from them, but as long as he or she left the 
land open and undeveloped, the public was free to use it for the purpose of fishing, . 
fowling, and navigation. Weston v. Sampson, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 347, 354-55 (1851); Austin 
v. Carter, 1 Mass. 231, 232 (1804). 
68. In Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79, 80 N.E. 688 (1907), the Supreme 
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"comparatively narrow interpretation of the scope of the public 
trust,"69 but this description is misleading. The court has, in cases 
centering on public rights in land affected by the Ordinance,7o 
merely enforced the easements which the Ordinance created. 
Since the Ordinance does not apply to land below the extreme low 
water mark, the court, in Butler v. Attorney General,71 indicated 
that public rights in such land were not limited to fishing, fowling 
or navigation.72 Similarly, in Home for Aged Women v. Common-
wealth,73 the Supreme Judicial Court stated that the public trust 
doctrine should be interpreted as a safeguard for not only the 
public's navigational rights in waters below the line of low tide 
but also "all necessary and proper uses" to which such waters 
could be put.74 Thus, the scope of the public trust doctrine is not 
necessarily more "narrow" in Massachusetts than in some other 
states. Rather, the Ordinance of 1641-47 removed the tidelands 
from the domain of public trust law and subjected them to the 
rules of private property. The grants of shoreline which the Ordi-
nance made to the owners of the adjoining uplands were much 
like the grants of tidal lands which various English kings made to 
favored subjects prior to the signing of the Magna Charta.75 Both 
necessitated defining the public's rights to use of the sea in terms 
of easements for the performance of specific activities. 
The Ordinance of 1641-47 and the common law doctrine of public 
trust which it modified are by no means historical curiosities. 
They remain a vital part of Massachusetts water law. In fact, the 
precise definition of the trust under which the state holds sub-
merged coastal land is still evolving, and has, in recent years, 
become the subject of debate in both the state courts and the 
Legislature. A brief discussion of this controversy is needed to 
Judicial Court held that the public had no right to use the flats for the purpose of 
bathing. Similarly, in Opinion of the Justices, the court warned that the state's creation 
of a foot path along the coastline between the high and low water marks would be an 
unconstitutional taking of property rights granted to upland owners by the Ordinance of 
1641-47. 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974). But see Barry v. Grela, 372 Mass. 278, 361 
N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (recognizing plaintiff's right to cross defendant's beach in order to fish 
from a jetty located on another's property). 
69. Graber, supra note 61, at 15. 
70. See cases discussed supra note 68. 
71. 195 Mass. 79, 80 N.E. 688 (1907). 
72. Id. at 83, 80 N.E. at 689 (dictum). 
73. 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E. 124 (1909). 
74. Id. at 434-35, 89 N.E. at 129. 
75. See supra text and notes at notes 24-31. 
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accentuate the continuing importance of the public trust doctrine 
in Massachusetts. 
B. Current Application of Public Trust in Massachusetts Water 
Law 
Although the Ordinance of 1641-47 rendered tidelands law in 
the Commonwealth more complex than that in states which have 
no such statute,76 the extent of both public and private rights to 
the shore is well-settled in Massachusetts. Oddly, however, the 
law governing Massachusetts' submerged lands, which is unaf-
fected by the Ordinance, has become muddled. The question of 
whether the Legislature may convey undersea land to private 
parties free of the public trust has been the central issue in three 
relatively recent Massachusetts cases. Two of the cases were 
authored by the Supreme Judicial Court, and one was decided by 
a Massachusetts federal district court. Although Massachusetts 
courts, in the first century of statehood, appeared to have re-
solved the alienability issue in favor of the Legislature's power to 
free land from the public trust,77 only one of the three modern 
, decisions followed this old line of cases. 
The first unsettling case, Boston Waterfront Development Corp. 
v. Commonwealth,78 arose in 1978. It involved certain statutes,79 
passed by the General Court more than a century ago, which gave 
the Boston Waterfront Development Corporation, a commercial 
enterprise, various wharfing privileges on historically submerged 
land in Boston Harbor.so The corporation claimed that, by virtue 
of the wharfing statutes, it held a fee simple title81 to the land at 
issue. According to the Commonwealth, however, these laws 
76. The Ordinance of 1641-47 is part ofthe law of Maine as well as Massachusetts. New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Maryland have also accorded 
upland owners property rights in the flats adjoining their land. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 
U.S. 1 (1894). Other jurisdictions make no legal distinction between tidelands and sub-
merged lands. Ownership of land below the high water mark is in the state, subject to the 
public trust. [d. 
77. See supra text at notes 58-59. 
78. 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979). For a thorough analysis of this case, see 
Comment, Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth: Title to Land Sear 
ward of the Historic Low-water Line, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 109 (1980). 
79. These statutes were known as the "Lewis Wharf Statutes," and included Act of 
March 25, 1834,ch. 115,1834 Mass. Acts 143; Act of March 27, 1835, ch. 76, 1835 Mass. Acts 
385; Act of March 7, 1840, ch. 18, 1840 Mass. Acts 187-188. 378 Mass. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 
357. 
80. 378 Mass. at 637-39, 393 N.E.2d at 361-62. 
81. See supra note 66. 
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granted the developer less comprehensive rights in the land. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the statutes granted the Boston 
Waterfront Development Corporation only a fee simple subject to 
a condition sUbsequent82 that the land always be used for a public 
purpose related to maritime commerce.83 The Court dismissed as 
dicta language in Commonwealth v. Boston Terminal CO.84 and 
other, older, cases which adopted the view that the Stat~~ was fully 
capable of relinquishing its trusteeship in submerged lands.85 
The court's holding in Boston Waterfront was based not only 
upon its interpretation of the relevant statutory language, but 
also upon its interpretation of the American development of the 
public trust doctrine as exemplified by Illinois Central. 86 The 
court was also swayed by its belief that the property at stake was 
part "of the Commonwealth's most precious natural resources"87 
which had "traditionally been held inviolably committed to the 
public domain."88 
The court's strong language implied that the legislature was 
not, after all, capable of freeing submerged lands from the rights 
of the public. This implication sparked considerable concern 
among owners of the Boston waterfront property which had been, 
at one time, part of Boston Harbor.89 The General Court re-
sponded to this concern by proposing legislation which, under 
certain conditions, would have eliminated any implied condition 
subsequent in favor of the Commonwealth in such land.90 Under 
82. "A fee simple subject to a condition subsequent exists when the fee simple is 
subject to a power in the grantor to terminate the estate granted on the happening of a 
specified event." If this event occurs, "the granted estate continues in existence until 
[the grantor] effectively exercises his option to terminate [the grant] .... " C. MOYNIHAN, 
supra note 66, at 36. 
83. 378 Mass. at 654, 393 N.E.2d at 369. 
84. 185 Mass. 281, 283-84, 70 N.E. 125, 126 (1904). 
85. 378 Mass. at 643, 393 N.E.2d at 364. 
86. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For discussion of this case, see supra text and notes at notes 
37-51. Some of the Illinois Central language quoted by the Boston Wateifront court, 378 
Mass. at 647, 393 N.E.2d at 366, is set forth supra note 39. 
The Boston Wateifront court, however, failed to consider that Illinois Central was an 
interpretation of Illinois public trust law and not a proclamation of American public 
trust law. See supra text at note 40. 
87. 378 Mass. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 357. 
88. Id. at 646, 393 N.E.2d at 365. 
89. See S. 2145 (1980); S. 2382 (1981). Over the centuries, much of the submerged land 
on the Harbor's perimeter has been filled in, raised above sea level, and built upon. See 
Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 357. 
90. S. 1001 (1981). See also H. 658, (1981); S. 2145 (1980); S. 2150 (1980); S. 2382 (1981). 
Although many such bills were introduced, none was ever enacted. 
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one proposed statute, S. 1001, the Commonwealth would have 
relinquished its interest in specific land if the Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs determined that the 
present or proposed use of such land would serve a public purpose 
noninjurious to public navigation in Boston Harbor.91 
The validity of this legislation was the subject of the 1981 
Opinion of the Justices,92 the second of the trio of recent Massa-
chusetts public trust cases. In its decision, the court held that a 
relinquishment of the public trust is within the power of the 
legislature if it is done in furtherance of a "proper public pur-
pose"93 and pursuant to explicit legislation.94 The court also im-
plied that it would overrule its decision in Boston Waterfront if it 
could.95 
91. S. 1001, § 4. 
92. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1361,424 N.E.2d 1092 (specifically discussing S. 1001). See also 
Opinion of the Justices, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1393, 424 N.E.2d 1111 (discussing H. 658). 
Unlike the federal Constitution, Massachusetts' constitution specifically authorizes the 
Supreme Judicial Court to render advisory opinions at the request of the House, the 
Senate, the governor, or the council. MASS. CONST. pt.2, c.3. art. II. Article III, section 2 
of the U.S. Constitution, in fact, prohibits the federal courts from granting advisory 
opinions by limiting their jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies." See U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54-57 (1978). 
93. What the court considered to be a "proper public purpose" is unclear. 1981 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1361 at 1376,424 N.E.2d 1092 at 1103. S. 1001, § 3 (1981) defined "public purpose" 
to include any lawful use of real estate, and "proper public purpose" to include the 
promotion of "commercial, industrial, residential, conservation and recreational devel-
opment of the city of Boston." S. 1001, § 2 (1981). The distinction between these two 
definitions is not apparent from the legislation. The court warned that the bill's broad 
definition of public purpose might not, in all instances, satisfy the Legislature's constitu-
tional duty to act for a public purpose. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1372, 424 N.E.2d at 1101. 
See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, c.l, § 1, art. IV. (The judiciary has developed its own body of law 
addressing the definition of public purpose within the meaning of the constitution. See 
cases cited in Mass. Home Mortgage Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l 
Bank, 376 Mass. 669, 676-84, 382 N.E.2d 1084, 1089-93 (1978); Opinion of the Justices, 368 
Mass. 880, 885-86, 335 N.E.2d 362, 365-66 (1975).) Nevertheless, the court found it "need not 
pause concerning this definition," because § 2 and § 4 of the legislation required that the 
land be used for a "proper public purpose" before the Commonwealth would relinquish 
its vestigial rights in the land. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1361 at 1376, 424 N.E.2d 1092 at 1103 
(emphasis in original). The court, in some unexplained way, distinguished between a 
public purpose and a proper public purpose. The justices joining in the minority opinion, 
however, were unable to find any distinction between the two. See id. at 1390-92, 424 
N.E.2d at 1111. 
94. See infra text at notes 132-42, 194-230. 
95. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1369,424 N.E.2d at 1099. In an accompanying footnote, the 
court explained why it could not overrule Boston Waterfront. The court stated: 
It is not open to the Justices in answering questions submitted to them under 
the Constitution to attempt to overrule a decision made by the court in a cause 
between party and party or to speculate upon the correctness of such a decision. 
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Opinion of the Justices is in keeping with the long line of Massa-
chusetts cases96 which recognize in no uncertain terms the power 
of the sovereign, acting through the legislature, to surrender the 
public trust. Moreover, the proposed legislation on which the 
opinion focused was virtually indistinguishable in its purpose 
from the Ordinance of 1641-47, the validity of which even the 
Boston Waterfront court dared not question. Like the Ordinance 
of 1641-47, the bill represented an effort by the Legislature to 
reconcile conflicting public interests. S. 1001 attempted to weigh 
the public's interest in the free availability of Boston Harbor 
against its demand for private ownership of land along the har-
bor's periphery. The Ordinance of 1641-47 attempted to resolve 
the conflict between the public's need for access to the shoreline 
and its need for the construction of commercial wharves. 
In Opinion of the Justices, the court was unable97 to renounce 
completely its position in Boston Wateifront. 98 It therefore at-
tempted to distinguish that case from the one before it. The court 
reasoned that Boston Wateifront rested on an analysis of common 
law principles and statutory provisions, while its present decision 
was based on constitutional considerations. The court noted that 
most states do not consider their constitutions a bar to legislative 
grants of absolute rights in land under the sea, but it nevertheless 
cautioned that "a gross or egregious disregard of the public inter-
est would not survive constitutional challenge."99 
This novel reference to the public trust doctrine as a potential 
constitutional restriction on the ability of the legislature to relin-
quish the public trust in submerged lands was repeated in U.S. v. 
1.58 Acres of Land, 100 a Massachusetts federal district court case 
If such a decision is to be overruled, it can only be after argument in another 
cause between party and party, where the rights of all can be fully guarded. 
Id. at 1369 n.2, 424 N.E.2d at 1099 n.2 (quoting Opinion ofthe Justices, 226 Mass. 613, 617, 
115 N .E. 978, 979 (1917». 
96. See supra text at notes 58-59. 
97. The court may not overrule a fully litigated case through an advisory opinion. See 
supra note 95. 
98. Boston Wateifront had held that submerged land which the state conveyed to 
private parties must always be put to legislatively approved public use. 378 Mass. 629, 
649, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (1979). 
99. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1370, 424 N.E.2d at 1099. This phrase seems to imply the 
existence of some special constitutional limitation on legislative control over submerged 
lands, which the court chose not to define specifically. Because pt.2, c.1, § 1, art. IV of the 
Massachusetts Constitution requires the legislature to act for a public purpose, however, 
the court may simply be referring to this existing constitutional restriction on the 
legislature's power to alienate public trust lands. 
100. 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981). 
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decided only two months after Opinion of the Justices. 1.58 Acres 
of Land involved the validity of the federal government's taking 
of certain Boston waterfront property belonging to the Common-
wealth. The property at issue lay below the historic low water-
mark. The Commonwealth challenged the United States' declara-
tion of takinglOl because it allowed for the ultimate disposition of 
the land to private individuals. The State claimed that this allow-
ance "could vitiate the perpetual public trust that is impressed 
upon the land."l02 The district court, relying on the same illinois 
Central language cited by the Boston Wateifront court,lOO held 
that neither the federal government nor the state government 
could free submerged land from the sovereign's jus publicum by 
conveying it to private parties. The court a~serted that the jus 
publicum could not be extinguished even by constitutional 
amendment, but only by the demise of the nation itself: "The 
trust is of such a nature that it can be held only by the sovereign, 
and can only be destroyed by the destruction of the sovereign."l04 
This language implies that the public trust may actually be a sort 
of superconstitutional restriction on the conveyance of sub-
merged lands. 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the law governing Mas-
sachusetts' submerged lands is presently in a state of unresolved 
turmoil. Prior to 1978, it seemed clear that the Legislature pos-
sessed the power to convey submerged land free from the public 
trust, because the jus publicum, the jus privatum, and all Parlia-
ment's rights of regulation had devolved upon the State at the 
time of the Revolution. The Boston Wate'1'jront case rejected 
longstanding precedent and denied the existence of this power. 
Its holding was reinforced three years later by a federal case, U.S. 
v. 1.58 Acres of Land. ThIS case, in turn, appears to be in direct 
conflict with the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in its Opinion 
of the Justices, which upheld, as a general proposition, the Legis-
lature's power to free land from the public trust. The only element 
common to both of the latter cases is their implication that, in 
certain, undefined instances, the public trust doctrine may rise 
above its common law origins and assume constitutional or super-
constitutional dimensions. To date, only one Massachusetts court, 
101. See 40 u.s.c. § 258a (1976) (authorizing the filing of declarations of taking by the 
United States and setting forth the required contents of such declarations). 
102. 523 F. Supp. at 121. 
103. ld. at 124. See supra note 39. 
104. ld. at 124. 
858 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:839 
the land court, has attempted to reconcile the holdings of these 
three cases, and its method of doing so was singularly unconvinc-
ing.105 
The judicial debate currently brewing in Massachusetts over 
the Legislature's ability to convey unencumbered title to the 
state's foreshore demonstrates the continuing vitality of the an-
cient doctrine of public trust and its ongoing importance as a 
framework for the formulation of coastal land use policy. The 
controversy, however, does not question the public trust doc-
trine's basic premise, which is the protection of the public's right 
to use resources essential to the welfare of society. It centers 
instead around the degree of power, if any, which the state or 
federal government should be given to dispose of publicly valued 
resources. Thus, it merely indicates that the judiciary is reexam-
ining the effectiveness of legislative discretion as a means of 
implementing the doctrine's essential purpose. This scrutiny may 
stem from a judicial perception that the modern legislature is no 
longer able to recognize diffuse public interests or willing to re-
spond to unvoiced public needsYl6 
Just as the method of implementing the public trust doctrine 
merits reassessment in light of current political realities, the 
scope of the doctrine also requires reevaluation in light of chang-
ing public needs or environmental conditions. Both the im-
plementation mechanism and the scope of the public trust are 
elements auxiliary to the doctrine's central purpose. These ele-
ments must be interpreted flexibly if the doctrine is to continue to 
fulfill its goal of preserving resources which satisfy important 
public needs.107 In this regard, the line of modern Massachusetts 
105. Newburyport Redevelopment Authority v. Commonwealth, No. 39,539 (Mass. 
Land Court July 1, 1982). The land court resolved its dilemma by reconstructing English 
common law. It concluded that the flats are subject only to the jus privatum, while land 
below the low water mark is subject only to the jus publicum. The legislature controls 
the jus privatum and may convey tidelands free from the limited rights which the jus 
privatum bestows on the public. However, no government action whatsoever can free 
submerged lands from the jus publicum with which they are impressed. Thus, the court 
concluded, any grant of submerged lands carries with it a condition that the lands 
always be used for a public purpose. Id. at 2-3. 
106. Joseph Sax has concluded that the public trust doctrine is simply a mechanism for 
judicial oversight of legislative action. "The 'public trust' has no life of its own and no 
intrinsic content. It is no more-and no less-than a name courts give to their concerns 
about the insufficiencies of the democratic process." Sax, supra note 19, at 521. 
107. As one commentator explained, 
The assertion by the public of a right to enjoy additional uses is met by the 
assertion that the public right is defined and limited by precedent based upon 
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cases which critique the doctrine's means of implementation108 
parallels the Illinois Central case,109 which expanded the doc-
trine's scope to include navigable bodies of freshwater. The re-
mainder of this article will explore another extension of the doc-
trine's scope: its applicability to publicly-owned, non submerged 
land. 
III. EXTENSION OF THE PUBUC TRUST DOCTRINE TO INLAND 
AREAS 
Tradition has kept the public trust doctrine confined primarily 
to large bodies of water and their shores. The doctrine is not, 
however, inherently more applicable to submerged land than to 
dry land. In fact, the historical reasons for applying different legal 
principles to the two types of land have largely disappeared. Both 
are currently in demand for development and both satisfy impor-
tant public needs. F'ree availability of undeveloped land may have 
become as vital to modern society's well-being as unrestricted 
access to the sea. The doctrine of public trust is an appropriate 
means of preserving inland areas subject to public use. Moreover, 
the importance of applying the doctrine to land increases as pub-
licly available property comes under mounting pressure from 
commercial interests within the private sector. 
A. Public Trust's Applicability to Non-Submerged Land 
This article has defined the purpose of the public trust doctrine 
as the protection of resources on which important public activities 
depend. Joseph Sax, in his seminal article on public trust law,l1O 
refined this simple notion by identifying three general types of 
public interests guarded by the doctrine. First, he noted, there are 
"certain interests [which] are so intrinsically important to every 
citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society as one 
of citizens rather than serfs."l11 Second, there are "certain inter-
ests which are so particularly the gifts of nature's bounty that 
past uses and past demand. But such a limitation confuses the application of the 
principle under given circumstances with the principle itself. 
The law regarding the public use of property held in part for the benefit of the 
public must change as the public need changes. 
1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, 202 (1967). 
108. See supra text and notes at notes 78-106. 
109. See supra text at notes 37-51. 
110. Sax, supra note 19. 
111. Id. at 484. 
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they ought to be reserved for the whole of the populace."1l2 Third, 
there are "certain [resources, such as water, which] have a pecu-
liarly public nature that makes their adaptation to private use 
inappropriate."1l3 
It seems clear that the first two factors probably pertain to the 
public's interest in certain upland areas as well as in submerged 
land. The third factor's applicability to dry land, however, is more 
questionable. Water has always been thought to possess a pecu-
liarly public nature, whIch is reflected in the following assertion, 
made in 1850: "The demand for land is, in a great degree, an 
individual demand ... while the demand for water is a demand of 
the public,-a demand of commerce, in which the State and na-
tion have a deep and vital interest."1l4 While this statement per-
ceptively isolates public demand as the essence of the pubhc trust, 
the basis for its distinction between land and water needs reeval-
uation. Historically, the most common uses for submerged lands, 
such as fishing and navigating, were ones for which the right of 
exclusivity was unimportant. The rights of the public therefore 
dominated the sea. Meanwhile, the rights of the individual, 
championed by private ownership, ruled the land. Tidelands were 
not then, as they are now, subject to a countervailing pressure for 
devotion to individual enterprises.us 
There is, however, another side to private ownership's growing 
challenge to continued public use of submerged lands. Just as the 
nation's technological development and industrial expansion 
have increasingly made the sea a target of private enterprise,1l6 
population growth and modern patterns of low-density commer-
cial and residential land use117 have created growing pressure for 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 485. 
114. S. Doc. No.3, at 28 (1850), quoted in Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Common-
wealth, 378 Mass. 629, 640, 393 N.E.2d 356, 362 (1979). 
115. Tidelands are not immune from such pressure, as the legislation drafted in 
response to the Boston Wate'fjront decision, and approved by the Supreme Judicial Court 
in its 1981 Opinion of the Justices, indicates. See supra text at notes 92-99. See also, 
Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981) (approving constitutionality of a bill, very 
similar to Massachusetts'S. 1001, which would have eliminated any interest of the public 
in privately owned, filled tidelands and submerged lands); People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 
576, 591-92, 138 P. 79, 85-86 (1913) (noting that the State of California sometimes sold 
tidelands which could be made agriculturally productive). 
116. E.g., Jacobs, Sea & Space: Industry's New Frontiers, INDUSTRY WEEK, Dec. 14, 
1981, at 58; Dempsey, Novel Technology Increases Drilling Potential, WORLD OIL, July 
1982, at 92. 
117. See sources cited supra note 2. 
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the preservation of those undeveloped uplands which are pre-
sently available to the public. us The usefulness of this same land 
to private developers has driven up its market value, however, 
and has rendered the provision of large areas of land for public 
use a task which the government is uniquely suited to perform. 
Thus, the public-private distinction between land and water 
which was so obvious in 1850 is rapidly disappearing. Today, the 
essential elements of public trust, defined by Sax,U9 are as appli-
cable to land above water as to that below water. 
B. Desirability of Incorporating Public Trust Concepts into Land 
Use Law 
When the United States was predominantly an agrarian soci-
ety, individual ownership of large tracts of open land was com-
mon.120 Today, however, many modern urban dwellers own only 
their own housing unit or no real property at al1.121 Therefore, 
they must rely on the government to provide them with open 
spaces for exercise and recreation. As the number of "landless" 
Americans grows, so does the need to introduce into land use law 
the concept of public trust, which protects the interests of mem-
bers of the public in property to which they do not hold title.122 
118. This article discusses the public trust doctrine as applied only to undeveloped 
land. To the author's knowledge, the doctrine has never been used to preserve manmade 
appurtenances to public property. Such an application of the doctrine, however, seems 
like a logical extension of its basic purpose of protecting resources incident to important 
public uses. Although public trust has become inextricably linked to environmental 
protection, there seems to be no historical basis for limiting it to that context. The 
doctrine has traditionally defended the public nature of large bodies of water because of 
their importance to commerce and navigation, see supra text at notes 37-50, apparently 
without regard for the effect which those activities may have on the purity of the 
waterways which support them. Considering the importance to modern American soci-
ety of transportation and communication networks, for example, and the essentially 
public nature of airports and highway systems, it would seem reasonable to find such 
assets also subject to the public trust. It is unlikely, however, that the public trust 
doctrine would ever be needed to preserve their viability. Their importance to the 
American economy virtually guarantees that they will never be transferred into private 
hands or allowed to fall into serious disrepair. 
119. See supra text at notes 111-113. 
120. CJ., Kloppenburg, supra note 2, at 37. 
121. See Edgerton, supra note 3, at 44, 48-49; Stokes, supra note 4; Young & Devaney, 
What the 1980 Census Shows About Housing, AM. DEMOGRAPIDCS, Jan. 1983, at 17, 21. 
122. Sax has noted that: 
The central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing disappoint-
ment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as 
title. The function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such public 
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Although there are legal mechanisms, such as the doctrines of 
adverse possession,123 custom,124 and prescription,12.'5 which pro-
tect established public uses of private land, these methods are less 
flexible than the public trust doctrine, and they have not gener-
ally been applied to government-owned property. Demands for 
open space and access to areas of natural beauty may also be met 
in part by private individuals' creation of charitable trusts126 and 
expectations against destabilizing changes, just as we protect conventional 
property from such changes. 
Sax, Shackles, supra note 20, at 188. 
123. The doctrine of adverse possession allows a person to acquire rights in land of 
another by occupying or using it without a claim of right for a statutorily defined length 
of time, known as the statute ofiimitations, in a manner that is open, notorious, adverse, 
continuous, and exclusive. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 302, 340 
(2d ed. 1975). However, this doctrine does not help preserve the public's interest in land 
which is made available for public use, because permissive use does not contravene any 
rights of private ownership. Therefore, such use does not satisfy the doctrine's require-
ment of adversity, and does not prevent the owner from excluding the public at will. 
124. Custom is more useful than adverse possession as a means of formally establish-
ing public rights in land which the public has used with the owner's consent. It, too, 
however, is of limited applicability because it requires the public use to have existed 
since time immemorial, which is generally considered to be established by twenty years 
of uninterrupted use. State ex rei Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 595-97, ,162 P.2d 671, 677 
(1969); Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387, 409 (1851). Massachusetts has included this notion of 
custom in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c.79 § 5 (West 1969) which is intended to help preserve 
public parkland. The statute states in part: 
No portion of a common or park dedicated to the use of the public, or appropri-
ated to such use without interruption for a period of twenty years, shall be taken 
[by eminent domain] or used as a public way, canal, railroad or railway, or for 
altering or widening the same, except with the consent of the city or town in 
which such common or park is situated .... 
For a case construing this statute, see Needham v. County Comm'rs of Norfolk, 324 
Mass. 293, 86 N.E.2d 63 (1949). 
125. Prescription is a third means by which the public may acquire the legal right to 
utilize private property. However, it is unclear what actions must be taken to establish a 
prescriptive easement, because prescription is frequently confused with adverse posses-
sion and custom. See J. CRIBBET, supra note 123, at 340-41. 
For a general discussion of the applicability of these doctrines to tidelands law in 
various states, see Note, Who Owns the Beach? Massachusetts Refuses to Join the Trend 
of Increasing Public Access, 2 URB. L. ANN. 283 (1976). 
126. It is important to distinguish between the doctrines of public trust and charitable 
trust because the two may be easily confused. Under both doctrines the state is the 
trustee and the public is the beneficiary. However, the two differ in critical ways. First, 
the notion of charitable trust concerns itself solely with the intent of the donor, while the 
doctrine of public trust focuses on the interests of the public. Second, the legal mecha-
nism inhibiting change in the use of land subject to a charitable trust is the law of 
contract, whereas the method of enforcing the public trust is explicit legislative action. 
(See supra text at notes 58-59, and infra text and notes at notes 132-42, 194-230.) The 
distinction between the two was made explicit in Dunphy v. Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 
376,331 N.E.2d 883 (1975), in which the Supreme Judicial Court held that a skating rink 
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dedications of land,t27 and by governmental entities' development 
could not be constructed on land donated to the town of Rockland "to be kept and used as 
a Public Park in perpetuity for the public good" [d. at 378, 331 N.E.2d at 884, despite 
legislative approval. The Supreme Judicial Court determined that the construction 
would be inconsistent with the land's use as a public park, and would thus violate the 
town's contractual obligation to abide by the terms of the trust. Because the Legisla-
ture's approval of the skating rink contravened that obligation, such action violated the 
clause of the Federal Constitution prohibiting legislative impairment of contracts. U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 10. 368 Mass. at 382, 331 N.E.2d at 886. See also Opinion of the Justices, 
369 Mass. 979, 338 N.E.2d 806 (1975); Salem v. Attorney General, 344 Mass. 626, 183 
N.E.2d 859 (1962); Milton v. Attorney General, 314 Mass. 234,49 N.E.2d 909 (1943); Adams 
v. Plunkett, 274 Mass. 453, 175 N.E. 60 (1931); Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N.E. 
92 (1890). That the prescribed use of charitable trust land cannot be altered, even with 
legislative approval, plainly indicates that charitable trust is something quite different 
than public trust. 
Despite this significant distinction, courts often describe public trust land and charita-
ble trust land in the same sort of terms. This is because charitable trusts are often used 
to preserve areas of natural beauty or public importance. In Dunphy, the Supreme 
Judicial Court remarked upon Reed Park's availability to the public for over 50 years and 
its support of "a stand of trees of great age." 368 Mass. at 379, 331 N.E.2d at 885. The 
court made similar observations in the earlier case of Nickols v. Comm'rs of Middlesex 
County, 341 Mass. 13, 166 N.E.2d 911 (1960), which interpreted the terms of the trust 
under which the state held title to the land encompassing Walden Pond. It observed that 
the "grants were unique real estate in the history of Concord and of American letters." 
341 Mass. at 22, 166 N.E.2d at 918. Although the intentions of the settlors of charitable 
trusts may sometimes coincide with notions of public trust law, as they did in these two 
cases, the inherent differences in the functions of the two doctrines precludes using the 
former as a substitute for the latter. 
127. Like the doctrine of charitable trust, the common law doctrine of dedication has 
also been posited in contract terms. The creation of a dedication requires an offer from 
the donor and an acceptance by the public, both of which may be either express or 
implied from the actions of the parties. Note, Public Ownership of Land Through Dedica-
tion, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (1962). Thus, the landowner's mere assent to public use may 
constitute an offer and public use itself can constitute acceptance. E.g., Cincinnati v. 
White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431, 440 (1832); Attorney General v. Abbott, 154 Mass. 323, 328, 28 
N.E. 346, 347 (1891). The public use need not continue over any established period oftime. 
E.g., Abbott v. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521, 526, 10 N.E. 325, 329 (1887). After the 
dedication, the title to the property remains in the owner, but the public receives an 
easement from which the owner cannot free the land. Attorney General v. Abbott, 154 
Mass. 323, 328-29, 28 N.E. 346, 348 (1891). 
Because the public gives no consideration for this property right, some courts have 
analogized dedication to a gift. E.g., Longley v. Worcester, 304 Mass. 580, 588, 24 N.E.2d 
533, 537 (1939); Abbott v. Cottage City, 143 Mass. at 525, 10 N.E. at 329. It has also been 
discussed in terms of equitable estoppel; an owner who, by an act of dedication, has led 
the public to believe that land will be available for public use should not be permitted to 
disappoint that expectation. Cincinnati v. White, 31 U.S. at 438. This rationale for the 
doctrine of dedication is very similar to Sax's articulation of the underlying purpose of 
the doctrine of public trust. See supra note 122. Dedication also resembles public trust in 
its capacity to account for subtle public needs, such as psychological renewal, which 
almost defy precise definition. See Attorney General v. Vineyard Grove Co., 181 Mass. 
507,508,509,64 N.E. 75 (1902) (ordering the removal of a building which obstructed the 
view of the sea from a bluff dedicated to the public); Attorney General v. Abbott, 154 
Mass. at 328, 28 N.E. at 348 (noting that, even if no improvements were made by the 
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of public recreation areas and preservation of natural resources. 
These activities, however, merely create the opportunity for fu-
ture public use. They do not fill the public trust doctrine's function 
of recognizing and legitimizing patterns of public use already in 
existence. 
Despite the pressing reasons for interjecting public trust con-
cepts into land use law, courts and commentators have generally 
been slow to recognize its importance in that context. This hesi-
tancy may result from a perception that the crucial public uses to 
which water has traditionally been devoted simply have no coun-
terparts on land. Certainly the tremendous physical differences 
between dry and submerged land dictate that the uses to which 
the public puts each type of land are likely to be commensurately 
different. The obvious distinctions between the two types of uses 
may obscure the more subtle similarities. 
The contrasts and parallels between these uses may be demon-
strated by a comparison of two traditional, water-related ac-
tivities, commerce and fishing, with the recreational use of land. 
Historically, commerce was considered public not only because it 
provided a livelihood for many members of the public, but also 
because it simply could not be performed on an individual basis. It 
required concerted effort. Recreation, on the other hand, is highly 
individualized, and therefore has not generally been recognized 
as an important public activity, even though a great portion of 
society regularly engages in it. 
Fishing, like recreation, was traditionally performed individ-
ually. The former, however, differed from the latter in a major 
way. Because fishing fulfilled the most basic of human needs, 
physical sustenance, the public importance of both the activity 
and the water which supported it was always self-evident. 
donor on dedicated parkland, "there [would] still be some benefit from having a space left 
for air, and for an open, unobstructed prospect.") However, dedication differs from public 
trust, and instead parallels charitable trust, in the emphasis it places on the acts and 
intent of the private donor rather than on the needs of the public as a means of 
determining the relative rights of the two. Compare, eg., Longley v. Worcester, 304 Mass. 
580,24 N.E.2d 533 (1939) (describing the character of private actions indicative of dedica-
tion) with Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E. 124 (1909) 
(holding that a tideland owner's rights of access to the sea from his upland property is 
superceded by the Commonwealth's right to fill his tidelands for the improvement of 
public navigation). 
The Supreme Judicial Court has occasionally used public trust language to describe 
the State's duties with regard to dedicated land. See Cogman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 
149,89 N.E.177, 178 (1909) (stating that, "[a]s the holder of the title [to Boston Common, 
the State] is in a kind of trust relationship to the people for whose use the property was 
provided.") 
1984] PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 865 
The social value of recreation and the land on which it is per-
formed is less obvious. The importance of open spaces, however, 
lies in the psychological sustenance which they give the modern 
urbanite.l28 Because recreational uses provide a crucial buffer 
against the stresses of urban life, they are probably no less impor-
tant to the long-term welfare of modern society than fishing and 
commerce were to the society of our ancestors. The differences in 
character between modern land uses and traditional aquatic uses 
does not justify according the former less protection than the 
latter. Judicial reluctance to extend the public trust doctrine to 
inland areas has produced this effect. 
Happily, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is not 
among those judicial bodies which have failed to envision a role 
for public trust in land use law. In fact, the Supreme Judicial 
Court has been applying public trust concepts to public land for 
almost three quarters of a century.l29 Its method of doing so, 
however, has been rather circuitous and not entirely satisfactory, 
as the following section explains. 
IV. THE INCORPORATION OF PUBLIC TRUST INTO 
MASSACHUSETTS LAND LAW 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized the ap-
propriateness of applying public trust concepts to public land, it 
has been unwilling to transfer the doctrine from water to land 
explicitly, apparently because of its concern for maintaining doc-
trinal continuity. It has applied to land only the doctrine's es-
sential purpose of sheltering public needs and expectations, and 
has transferred none of the doctrine's historical, common law 
trappings, such as jus publicum and jus privatum.l30 The court 
has carried out the doctrine's central purpose by means of other 
doctrines more common to land use law. This fact explains the 
court's occasional discussion of public trust concepts in charitable 
trust and dedication cases.l3l The court, however, will use any 
legal tool which both fits the facts of the case and allows it to 
achieve the same result it would have reached by applying the 
public trust doctrine. It has sometimes found mere judicial review 
.128. See Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 590, 99 N.E. 523, 527 (1912), 
discussed infra, text at note 159. 
129. See discussion of Higginson infra, text at notes 156-61. 
130. See supra text at notes 27-31. 
131. See supra notes 126-27. 
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of legislative actions or statutory interpretation to be sufficient.l32 
The court's primary mechanism for the implementation of pub-
lic trust principles, however, is the doctrine of prior public use. 
Not only is this doctrine generally applicable to government-
owned land, but it also shares with public trust two important 
characteristics. Both focus on the uses to which land is presently 
put, and both require that changes in those uses be authorized by 
an act of the Legislature. 
A. Prior Public Use as a Vehicle for Public Trust 
1. The Doctrine of Prior Public Use 
The prior public use doctrine is a principle of eminent domain 
law which states, in essence, that "land appropriated to one public 
use cannot be diverted to another inconsistent public use without 
plain and explicit legislation to that end."l33 This doctrine,134 
which applies to all government entitiesl35 other than the 
sovereign itself,136 serves two purposes. 
First, by requiring legislative approval of any change in the use 
of public land, the doctrine forces legislatures to establish priori-
ties between multiple government entitiesl37 possessing the 
power of eminent domain. Without such a rule, either the courts 
themselves would have to engage in legislative decisionmaking by 
establishing such priorities, or the conflicting entities "might suc-
cessively try to take and retake the property ad infinitum."l36 
Thus, the rule promotes fiscal and social stability by establishing 
a hierarchy among the competing needs of the state's various 
governmental, quasi-governmental, and administrative bodies.l39 
132. See infra text at notes 267-73. 
133. Higginson, 212 Mass. at 591, 99 N.E. at 527-28. 
134. Prior public use is by no means unique to Massachusetts. See, e.g., Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in District of Columbia Vestry of 
Rock Creek Parish, 514 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1975); City of Shakopee v. Minnesota Valley 
Elec. Co-op, 303 N.W.2d 58 (1981); Hiland v. Ives, 154 Conn. 683, 228 A.2d 502 (1967). See 
also 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 12, § 2.2 at 57 (1981); Annot., 35 ALR3d 1302 (1971). 
135. These may include state agencies, municipalities, and public service corporations, 
such as railroads or utilities. See 1972173 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 45, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 
at 139, 144-46 (1973). 
136. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 12, § 2.2 at 55 (1981). 
137. See 1972173 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 45, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 139, 144-46 (1973) 
and cases cited therein. 
138. Commonwealth v. Mass. Turnpike Auth., 346 Mass. 250, 255, 191 N.E.2d 481, 485 
(1963). See also Weehawken v. Erie R.R. Co., 20 N.J. 572,579,120 A.2d 593, 596 (1956). 
139. Somerset v. Dighton Water Dist., 347 Mass. 738, 742, 200 N.E.2d 237, 239 (1964). 
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Second, the prior public use doctrine provides an objective re-
view mechanism for changes in the use of public land proposed by 
legislative delegatees. Because a state agency frequently does not 
have to pay for land which it takes from other agencies or munici-
palities,14O it is often more willing to appropriate public land than 
private land if it has a choice. Courts realize, however, that an 
alteration in the use of public land deserves no less careful consid-
eration than a diversion of private land to public purposes.141 The 
prior public use doctrine's judicially imposed requirement that 
change only be made pursuant to explicit legislation necessitates 
deliberate decisionmaking at the highest level of governmental 
authority.142 
Many of the Massachusetts cases which developed the prior 
public use doctrine arose in the nineteenth century, often be-
tween public service corporations or municipalities. In these 
cases, one entity typically claimed authority to take the other's 
land through its general power of eminent domain. Whether the 
Supreme Judicial Court permitted the attempted taking without 
requiring more explicit legislative authority usually depended 
upon its assessment of the compatibility between the proposed 
use and the existing use. In Springfield v. Connecticut River Rail-
road CO.,143 for example, the court prevented a railroad from using 
a track which it had built over a well-traveled city street. Simi-
larly, in Boston & Albany Railroad v. Cambridge,144 the court 
refused to allow the city of Cambridge to take a railroad's land for 
the establishment of a public park. The court generally permitted 
a taking, however, where the two public uses would not sig-
nificantly interfere with one another.145 Even where the contem-
140. See 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 12, § 2.225 [i) at 155 (1981); Annot., 56 ALR 365 (1928). 
141. Cf Sax, supra note 19, at 495-99. 
142. One commentator has argued that the power to authorize such change should be 
delegated by the Legislature to a specially created administrative body. The rationale for 
this contention is that this sort of legislative decisionmaking may be neither objective 
nor deliberate. Requiring the General Court to make decisions continually on an ad hoc, 
case by case basis, is burdensome and wasteful of legislative resources. Under these 
circumstances, the legislature may not be able to give competing interests the attention 
they deserve. Furthermore, the Legislature, in its haste, may be particularly susceptible 
to the influence of the agency advocating the change in use. 1967 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§ 11.3, at 196-97; 1970 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 17.20, at 481. 
143. 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 63 (1849). 
144. 166 Mass. 224, 44 N.E. 140 (1896). 
145. See, e.g., Boston v. Brookline, 156 Mass. 172, 30 N.E. 611 (1892) (defendant's 
construction of a road would not interfere with plaintiff's waterpipes, which lay in the 
land over which the road would pass); Easthampton v. County Comm'rs, 154 Mass. 424, 
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plated use conflicted with the existing one, the court upheld the 
attempted taking if the facts of the case indicated that the Legis-
lature, when it authorized the proposed project, must have known 
that its implementation would injure the plaintiff's current use of 
the property.l46 
Although most Massachusetts prior public use law was formu-
lated in the last century, the doctrine continues to serve its impor-
tant stabilizing function, as two relatively recent Supreme Judi-
cial Court opinions indicate. In Bauer v. Mitchell,147 the Essex 
County Agricultural School sought to enjoin the Essex County 
Tuberculosis Hospital from maintaining cesspools for the disposal 
of the hospital's sewage on the school's land. The court held that 
the hospital's appropriation of the school's land was impermissible 
without specific statutory authorization. 148 The more recent case 
of Somerset v. Dighton Water District l49 involved a conflict be-
tween two municipalities over their respective statutory rights to 
the waters of the Segreganset River. The court determined that 
the Legislature had empowered the town of Somerset to "take ... 
and hold ... the waters of [the] Segreganset river,"l50 and that no 
subsequent legislation concerning the Dighton Water District 
was sufficiently explicit to permit Dighton to divert the Segregan-
set's water away from Somerset. 
These cases demonstrate the types of situations in which the 
doctrine of prior public use continues to operate independently of 
any notions of public trust. When public trust concepts are in-
jected into the doctrine, however, its focus shifts from merely 
determining legislative priorities to weighing the relative values 
of conflicting public uses. This shift in focus, in turn, sometimes 
alters the traditional elements of the prior public use doctrine. 
These subtle modifications are the only doctrinal adaptation the 
Supreme Judicial Court has been willing to make in order to 
integrate public trust concepts into land use law. Therefore, they 
merit close examination. 
28 N.E. 298 (1891) (defendant's construction of a road over a sector of plaintiff's 
schoolhouse lot would not wholly prevent plaintiff from using its land for school pur-
poses). 
146. Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Framingham Water Co., 153 Mass. 561, 27 N.E. 662 (1891). 
147. Bauer v. Mitchell, 247 Mass. 522, 142 N.E. 815 (1924). 
148. Id. at 528, 142 N.E. at 817. 
149. 347 Mass. 738,200 N.E.2d 237 (1964). 
150. Id. at 742, 200 N.E.2d at 239. 
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2. How Prior Public Use May Change When Used in Conjunction 
with Public Trust 
When public trust principles are implemented through the doc-
trine of prior public use, the latter may change in two important 
ways. First, factors other than a conflict between governmental 
entities may invoke the prior public use doctrine. These factors 
include those which indicate that the land at stake serves the sort 
of public need generally protected by the public trust doctrine. 
Second, legislation authorizing a change in the use of land which 
the court finds subject to the public trust must be more explicit 
than that required in typical prior public use cases. It must not 
only establish legislative priorities, but must also demonstrate 
that the General Court recognized the public's interest in main-
taining the land in its present state. Each of these concepts may 
be clarified by tracing the line of cases through which it evolved. 
a. Making the Public Interest a Legislative Priority 
Early in the development of the prior public use doctrine, the 
Massachusetts courts began to recognize its potential not only as 
a tool for ensuring the orderly execution of legislative mandates, 
but also as a means of protecting the public's interest in land 
use.l5l The Supreme Judicial Court first hinted that notions of 
public trust could be included in a prior public use analysis in the 
1839 case of Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester Rail-
road COrp.1S2 The court noted that if the Legislature permitted an 
agency or other delegate to build a turnpike or railroad and gave 
it a general power of eminent domain to carry out its task, the 
delegate should not be permitted to use its power to take and 
destroy "an arsenal, fort, state-house, or land already appropri-
ated to a highly important, public use," unless the Legislature 
had unequivocally authorized such an action. 153 
By introducing the public trust concept of a "highly important 
public use" as a basis for invoking the prior public use doctrine's 
requirement of explicit legislation, the Boston Water Power court 
suggested that conflict between legislative directives could be 
created by inference, if none existed already. Stretching the scope 
of the prior public use doctrine by presuming the existence of 
151. See Sax, supra note 19, at 498-99. 
152. 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 360 (1839). 
153. Id. at 398. 
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friction between governmental bodies is common in cases in 
which public trust is being implemented through prior public use. 
In Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston, 154 and in Gould v. Greylock 
Reservation Commission,155 for example, the two governmental 
entities involved in each case were in complete accord about what 
was to be done with the land under consideration. Furthermore, 
in each case, there existed a statute authorizing the agreed upon 
change. Nevertheless, the court found the relevant statutes in-
sufficiently explicit to permit the contemplated alterations. Had 
the court, in each case, not presumed the public's interest in the 
current use of the land to be a legislative priority which conflicted 
with the wishes of the governmental bodies involved, there would 
have been no dispute for the court to resolve. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's willingness to consider the needs 
of the general public to be a primary legislative concern intro-
duces another issue central to the implementation of public trust 
through prior public use. That issue is, what public interests has 
the court elevated to the status of legislative priorities? Or, stated 
another way, how has the court identified land subject to the 
public trust? 
b. Defining the Public Interest: Criteria for Identifying Land 
Subject to the Public Trust 
Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston, 156 noted above, was the first 
case in which the Supreme Judicial Court used the prior public 
use doctrine for purposes other than mere administrative order. 
In that case, the court moved to protect a type of public resource 
which Professor Sax might describe as "so intrinsically important 
to every citizen that [its] free availability tends to mark the 
society as one of citizens rather than serfS."157 Higginson involved 
the validity of a statute permitting the park commissioners of 
Boston to authorize the construction of a high school on the Back 
Bay Fens park. The court determined that because one-fifth of 
the proposed building would be used to house the administrative 
offices of the school committee, the enabling statute, which re-
154. 212 Mass. 583, 99 N.E. 523 (1912). For further discussion of this case, see infra text 
and notes at notes 156-61. 
155. 350 Mass. 410, 215 N .E.2d 114 (1966). For further discussion of this case, see infra 
text and notes at notes 166-88. 
156. 212 Mass. 583, 99 N.E. 523 (1912). 
157. Sax, supra note 19, at 484. See also text at note 111. 
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ferred only to construction of a high school, was insufficiently 
explicit to allow the dual purpose structure to be built.15s The 
court phrased its holding in terms of its inability to determine the 
Legislature's priorities, but the opinion makes clear that the 
court's apprehension about administrative office space was 
merely a guise for its concern about the preservation of the little 
land in the central city still available for public recreation. 
The healthful and civilizing influence of parks in and near 
congested areas of population is of more than local interest 
and becomes a concern of the State under modern conditions. 
It relates not only to public health in its narrow sense, but to 
broader considerations of exercise, refreshment and enjoy-
ment ... There are decisions to the contrary by courts of 
recognized authority. [citations ommitted] But they were 
made before the absolute necessity of public parks as an 
accompaniment of modern urban congestion had become so 
apparent as it is now . . .159 
In assessing the public importance of parkland, the court was 
influenced by not only the city dweller's need for open space, but 
also the free availability of parkland to all members of the pub-
liC,t60 and the Commonwealth's general policy of preserving such 
recreational areas.161 
In a series of cases arising a half-century after Higginson, the 
Supreme Judicial Court expanded the types of public interests in 
land protected by the prior public use doctrine to include both 
vital natural resources and those resources which might be con-
sidered "particularly the gifts of nature's bounty."162 The first of 
these cases, Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike Author-
ity,l63 involved an attempt by the Massachusetts Turnpike Au-
thority to take from the Metropolitan District Commission certain 
lands in the Charles River Basin, including eight acres under the 
river itself which the Authority intended to fill for the relocation 
of a roadway. The court, recognizing that the filling "would cause 
irreparable damage by removing the minimal safety factor now 
158. 212 Mass. at 592, 99 N.E. at 528. Although a statute passed two years earlier 
authorized the construction of a building for both educational and administrative pur-
poses, the court refused to give any weight to this legislation. Id. 
159. Id. at 590, 99 N.E. at 527. 
160. Id. at 586-89, 99 N.E. at 525-27. 
161. Id. at 592, 99 N.E. at 528. 
162. Sax, supra note 19, at 484. See also text at note 112. 
163. 346 Mass. 250, 191 N.E.2d 481 (1963). 
! 
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available for proper flood control,"164 held that the statute grant-
ing the Authority a general power of eminent domain was in-
sufficiently explicit to permit such a taking.165 
Three years after Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the court 
handed down Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission,166 its 
most illuminating opinion to date with regard to the criteria by 
which public trust land may be identified. Mt. Greylock is the 
highest peak in an isolated mountain range in Western Massa-
chusetts.167 Its extreme elevation makes it the home of many 
species of flora and fauna not generally found south of Canada. It 
also features unusual geological formations.16s Due to the ac-
tivism of a citizen's group that wished to maintain it as " 'an 
unspoiled natural forest' ,"169 the mountain, in 1898, was made the 
focal point of the new Greylock State Reservation. This reserve is 
administered by a gubernatorially appointed Commission.170 In 
1953, the Legislature created the Mount Greylock Tramway Au-
164. Id. at 252, 191 N.E.2d at 483. 
165. This statute stated: 
The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority ... is hereby authorized and em-
powered ... to construct, maintain, repair and operate at such location as may 
be approved by the state department of public works a toll express highway 
... from a point in the vicinity of the city of Boston or from a point or points 
within said city to a point at or near the boundary line between the Common-
wealth and the State of New York. ... 
. . . The Authority is hereby authorized and empowered ... (k) To acquire in 
the name of the Authority ... by the exercise of the power of eminent domain ... 
such public lands, parks, playgrounds, reservations, cemeteries, highways or 
parkways, or parts thereof or rights therein ... as it may deem necessary for 
carrying out the provisions of this act ... 
Act of May 23, 1952, ch. 354, 1952 Mass. Acts 267 at 267, 270, as amended by Act of Feb. 9, 
1955, ch. 47, 1955 Mass. Acts 29, quoted in Commonwealth v. Mass. Turnpike Auth. 346 
Mass. at 252-253, 191 N.E.2d at 483-484. 
It is curious to note that this case presented a fact pattern almost identical to the 
hypothetical situation posed by the court more than a century earlier in Boston Water 
Power Co. v. Worcester R.R. Corp., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 360, 398 (1839), in which the court 
first suggested that certain critical public land uses could be sheltered by the doctrine of 
prior public use. See supra text at notes 152-53. 
166. 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). For a further analysis of this case as well as 
subsequent cases, which are discussed infra at notes 189-93, see Sax, sup'ra note 19, at 
492-502. 
167. 350 Mass. at 4i1, 215 N.E.2d at 116. 
168. Id. at 412 n.4, 215 N.E.2d at 118 n.4. 
169. Id. at 411, 215 N.E.2d at 116. 
170. Act of June 20, 1898, ch. 543, 1898 Mass. Acts 529, cited in id. at 412, 215 N.E.2d at 
116. 
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thority171 and empowered it to build on the mountain an aerial 
tramway, ski facilities,172 and other accomodations "reasonably 
necessary" for the public's convenience in using the recreation 
area and the tramway.173 In 1960, pursuant to a statute permit-
ting the Commissioner to lease reservation land to the Author-
ity,174 the Authority leased from the Commission 4000 acres, al-
most half the total area of the reservation. Four years later, the 
Authority entered into a "management agreement" with Amer-
ican Resort Services, a private corporation. This agreement em-
powered the private company to carry out most of the Authority's 
operational and administrative duties after the resort's develop-
ment had been completed.175 Prior to the execution of this con-
tract, American Resort Services' parent organization had pre-
sented to the Authority elaborate plans for the construction of the 
tramway, ski lifts, and extensive auxiliary facilities.176 Before the 
construction was underway, however, a group of citizens filed suit 
against the Commission. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate the 
lease and the management agreement and to prohibit the con-
struction of the ski resort. 
The court, in its painstaking analysis of this complex factual 
situation, seemed particularly troubled by three factors: the de-
velopment's interference with the area's ecology,177 the degree to 
which private parties would benefit financially from the develop-
mentp8 and the restricted segment of the public to which the 
171. Act of July 1, 1953, ch. 606, 1953 Mass. Acts 568, cited in 350 Mass. at 413-14,215 
N.E.2d at 118. 
172. Exactly what sort of "ski facilities" the Legislature had envisioned was a central 
issue in the case and one which the court was unable to resolve conclusively from its 
examination of the relevant legislative history. See 350 Mass. at 420 n.15, 215 N.E.2d at 
122 n.15. 
173. Act of July 1, 1953, ch. 606, § 6, 1953 Mass. Acts 568 at 570, amended by Act of June 
24, 1955, ch. 476, § 2, 1955 Mass. Acts 391 at 392-394, quoted in 350 Mass. at 414 n.6, 215 
N.E.2d at 118 n.6. 
174. Act of June 24,1955, ch. 476, § 7, 1955 Mass. Acts 391 at 395-96, quoted in 350 Mass. 
at 415, 215 N.E.2d at 119. 
175. 350 Mass. at 417,215 N.E.2d at 120. 
176. These facilities were to include "a large activity center ... [with] a swimming pool, 
restaurant, fireplace, barbecue pit, bar, sundeck, summer dance terrace, ski shop, gift 
shop, ski rental and repair room and parking space for 2000 automobiles." Id. at 416, 215 
N.E.2d at 120. The ski runs were to include, in addition to the tramway, "four separate 
double chair lifts and eleven ski trails ... , an upper terminal house, and an expanded 
[lodge at the summit]." Id. 
177. 350 Mass. at 421, 215 N.E.2d at 122-23. 
178. Id. at 424, 426, 215 N.E.2d at 125, 126. 
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land would be useful.179 Considering these factors as well as the 
reservation's unusual natural features,180 and the area's attrac-
tiveness to naturalists, students, tourists, and hikers,1sl the court 
called the Greylock Reservation "rural park land,"l82 and declared 
it to be subject to Higginson's prior use rule requiring specific 
legislative action.l83 
The court's insistence that the Greylock Reservation be devel-
oped as a ski resort only upon explicit instructions from the 
legislature does not represent a shift in emphasis from public use 
to natural resource as the touchstone of the public trust doctrine. 
Rather, it merely indicates the judiciary's recognition that some 
natural resources possess such unusual characteristics that their 
very existence is valuable to the public as a whole, and that any 
acts which diminish the value of these resources merit careful 
legislative scrutiny. 
By rejecting the Authority's development plans, the Gauld 
court also acknowledged implicitly that the sheer number of 
people who use a particular piece of undeveloped property is an 
inappropriate yardstick by which to measure land's public impor-
tance. As the court apparently recognized, the mere knowledge 
that such an undisturbed haven is available to the public may 
bring peace of mind to the urban dweller, regardless of how 
frequently he or she is actually able to take advantage of its 
tranquility.l84 Furthermore, the public trust doctrine, as it origi-
nally developed under Roman law,ls5 protected all noninjurious 
public uses of the shore. Enhancing the land's utility to one 
segment of the public at the expense of the rest is not in keeping 
with the concept of public trust. The value of the land for public 
trust purposes must therefore be gauged by its usefulness to the 
general public and not to any particular segment of the popula-
tion. 
The essence of this portion of the Gauld decision was perhaps 
stated best by a Superior court judge in the similar case of Dun-
phy v. Commonwealth. ISS Referring to a tract of parkland on which 
179. See id. at 416, 215 N.E.2d at 120. 
180. See supra text at notes 167-68. 
181. 350 Mass. at 412 n.4, 215 N.E.2d at 118 n.4. 
182. Id. at 419, 215 N.E.2d at 121. 
183. Id. See also supra text at notes 158-61. 
184. Cf Huffman, Wilderness and Freedom, 16 IDAHO L. REV. 407 (1980). 
185. See supra text at notes 13-23. 
186. 368 Mass. 376, 331 N.E.2d 383 (1975). For a lengthier discussion of this case, see 
supra note 126. 
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the town of Rockland planned to build a skating rink, the judge 
remarked, 
When ... for all practical purposes, the entirety of the area is 
devoted to a permanent building, and hot-top parking spaces 
and driveways, the parcel is no longer a park with a skating 
rink. It is a skating rink-period. The preservation of a token 
number of trees does not change the situation. The public at 
large will no longer use [the park]. Skaters will use it.187 
Since free accessibility is a crucial characteristic of public trust 
land, the preservation of that accessibility is central to the state's 
faithful execution of its duties as trustee, as long as the land 
remains subject to the trust. Honoring this trust may therefore 
require the state to maintain land in its natural condition, not 
because the public trust doctrine necessitates leaving trust land 
untouched, but because the doctrine mandates free availability. It 
may be that there is no feasible means of developing the land 
which does not result in the exclusion of some segments of the 
public, and therefore, unless the Legislature eliminates the public 
trust through explicit legislation, leaving the land in an undevel-
oped state may be the only means of ensuring that virtually 
everyone will be able to make some use of it.l88 
187. ld. at 380-81, 331 N.E.2d at 885. Joseph Sax considers this notion "the central 
substantive thought" of public trust law. Sax, supra note 19, at 490. He has phrased this 
principle in the following, somewhat more elegant, manner: 
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general 
public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental 
conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restrictive 
uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties. I d. (emphasis 
in original) 
Sax, supra note 19, at 490. 
188. Paradoxically, excluding the public from trust lands sometimes may be the state's 
best means of responsibly discharging its duties as trustee of land possessing resources 
which are not only vital or unusual, but also fragile or dangerous. In 1980, the Attorney 
General rendered an opinion concerning the issuance of exclusive land permits by the 
Department of Environmental Management (DEM) to property owners whose land 
abutted the shoreline of a reservoir owned by DEM. He concluded that the issuance of 
such permits was in conformity with the Department's duties as trustee of undeveloped 
public land. Among the reasons which supported his opinion were the need to insure 
public safety by limiting access to the reservoir, the impracticality of making the small, 
irregularly-shaped perimeter strip recreationally useful, and the fact that exclusivity 
enhanced both conservation projects and the reservoir's overall environmental quality. 
1979/80 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 15, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 129, 131 (1980). See also 
Nelson, supra note 39. Nelson argues that the nature of the public interest which the 
state should protect has shifted from "promotion and protection of use and commerce to 
non-use and enhancement of ecology." ld. at 497. This view supports the position of the 
Attorney General. 
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In the three years following Gauld, the Supreme Judicial Court 
twice more identified public trust land by using some of the same 
criteria it had defined in Gauld, namely, the free availability of the 
land and the uniqueness of its resources. It then gave the legisla-
ture an opportunity to reconsider the importance of the public 
uses dependent on those lands by declaring the lands subject to 
the doctrine of prior public use. Sacco v. Department of Public 
Works,189 which arose in 1967, centered around an attempt by the 
Department of Public Works to fill part of a Great Pond in the 
town of Arlington for the expansion of a state highway. "The 
Great Ponds of this Commonwealth," the court stressed, "are 
among its most cherished natural resources. Since early times 
they have received special protection."l90 The court therefore re-
fused to permit any filling of the pond unless the legislature 
passed a more specific enabling statute. 
Robbins v. Department of Public Works,191 decided two years 
after Sacco, involved an area called Fowl Meadows, described by 
the court as "wetlands of considerable natural beauty with a 
large capacity for the storage of water during flood seasons and 
[which] are often used for nature study and recreation."'l92 Had it 
not been for the court's requirement of more explicit statutory 
authorization, the Meadows would have been transferred from 
the Metropolitan District Commission to the Department of Pub-
lic Works, and turned into an interstate cloverleaf. 
The foregoing discussion has identified the types of factors 
which the Massachusetts courts have considered in gauging the 
value of particular public land to the people, and thus, in deter-
mining whether that land should be considered subject to the 
public trust. This determination, in tum, dictates whether a court 
will presume the present use of the land to be a legislative priority 
requiring the invocation of the prior public use doctrine, even in 
the absence of agency conflict. If a court applies this doctrine, 
then the land cannot be devoted to a new, inconsistent use "with-
out plain and explicit legislation to that end."l93 A court's decision 
189. 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967). 
190. Id. at 671, 227 N.E.2d at 479. The court, in this statement, was alluding to the 
special provisions for the public's access to Great Ponds established by the Massachu-
setts Bay Colonists in the Ordinance of 1641-47. See supra text and note at note 54. 
191. 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969). 
192. Id. at 329, 244 N.E.2d at 578. 
193. Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 591, 99 N.E. 523, 527-28 (1912). 
See supra text at note 133. 
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to employ prior public use, however, leaves unanswered one im-
portant question: precisely what constitutes "plain and explicit 
legislation" sufficient to free land from the public trust? 
c. Protecting the Public Interest: The Heightened Standard for 
Legislation Mfecting Public Trust Land 
When a court is presented with a simple interagency eminent 
domain dispute, it attempts to establish the order of the Legisla-
ture's priorities by interpreting the potentially conflicting en-
abling statutes. The change in use statute need only be specific 
enough to indicate that the Legislature prefers the new use over 
the old one. If the court cannot discern the Legislature's prefer-
ence from its analysis of the relevant pieces of legislation, it will 
apply the prior public use doctrine and will require that the 
current use be continued until the legislature chooses to express 
itself more clearly. 
When a court finds land subject to the public trust, however, it 
will presume the existing use of that land to be a Legislative 
priority because of its inherent value to the public. This presump-
tion creates an artificial situation by attributing to the legislature 
a judgment which, in reality, the legislature never made. In such 
instances, the court is, in fact, expressing its own unwillingness to 
give effect to the legislative action rather than its inability to 
identify the legislature's will.l94 This point is an important one 
because the degree of statutory specificity which a court requires 
to permit a change in the use of public lands is determined largely 
by the court's own assessment of both the importance of the use 
to which the public currently puts the particular piece of land and 
the degree to which the proposed use will interfere with the 
presently existing one. 
While the standard for requisite legislative precision has varied 
from case to case, an overview of prior public use law indicates 
that courts have generally held the Legislature to a higher degree 
of specificity in cases involving public trust land. In such cases, 
courts have required the Legislature to indicate not only that it 
approves of the change in use but also that its approval is the 
product of deliberate and informed decisionmaking.l95 This propo-
194. See Sax, supra note 19, at 494-95. 
195. See id. at 502. 
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sition can be illustrated by reviewing the statute at issue in each 
of the cases discussed above.l96 
In Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston,l97 the Supreme Judicial 
Court recognized that the Legislature had adequately authorized 
the construction of a school on the Back Bay Fens park,l98 Al-
though it acknowledged that the Legislature had made clear its 
priorities as between the park and the school building, the court 
nevertheless declared itself unable to determine the Legislature's 
priorities as between the park and a school building which con-
tained twenty-one percent administrative office space.l99 There-
fore, the court held that the high school could not be erected 
unless the city agreed to build the type of structure originally 
authorized.20o It seems unlikely that the court would have re-
quired such legislative detail if it had not itself determined the 
value of the park to the public to be at least as great as that of the 
school, and that the Legislature's decision to destroy the park 
therefore merited reconsideration. 
The court reached a similar conclusion in Gould v. Greylock 
Reservation Commission,20l when it weighed the public impor-
tance of the Greylock Reservation as a recreation area and nature 
preserve against its value as a ski resort. In considering the 
explicitness of the relevant enabling act,202 it questioned whether 
the elaborate, commercially-oriented project proposed by the Au-
thority exceeded the scope of the enabling legislation. Although 
the court did not base its decision on the prior public use doc-
trine,203 it nevertheless concluded that if the Legislature had in-
196. See supra text at notes 156-61, 166-91. 
197. 212 Mass. 583,99 N.E. 523 (1912). 
198. Act of June 10, 1911, ch. 540, 1911 Mass. Acts 561, cited in id. at 592, 99 N.E. at 528. 
199. 212 Mass. at 592, 99 N.E. at 528. 
200. ld. at 592-93, 99 N.E. at 528. 
201. 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). 
202. Act of July 1, 1953, ch. 606,1953 Mass. Acts 568, amended by Act of June 24, 1955, 
ch. 476, 1955 Mass. Acts 39, cited in id. at 420, 215 N.E.2d at 122. 
203. Instead, the court reached the same result by using other interpretative tools. 
First, it found that the lease by the Greylock Reservation Commission to the Greylock 
Tramway Authority of almost half the reservation could not be permitted under a 
"reasonable" inte:l-pretation of the authorizing statute, because the statute must have 
meant for the lease to be limited to land needed by the Authority for the actual 
construction of its project. "If this is not the proper interpretation," the court warned 
ominously, "then the Legislature has delegated to the Commission (without clearly 
defining the scope of what is intended, essentially without restrictions, and subject to no 
sufficiently stated standards) power to deal in its unfettered discretion with a large, 
unique tract of public park land." 350 Mass. at 422, 215 N.E.2d at 123. The court refused 
to comment further upon the validity of such an act by the Legislature. Second, the court 
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tended to authorize the development of such a grandiose enter-
prise, it would have stated its approval in more definite and 
specific terms.204 
The court's decision to prevent the partial filling of a Great 
Pond in Sacco v. Department of Public Works 205 required less 
justification than its holdings in either Higginson or Gould. The 
authorizing statutes relied upon by the Department of Public 
Works in Sacco were far more general than those which had been 
at issue in either of the other cases. The Sacco court held that 
neither the statute granting the department broad powers of 
eminent domain206 nor the act giving the department charge of 
held that the management agreement between the Authority and American Resort 
Services was a greater delegation of the Authority's powers and duties than was au-
thorized by its statute of origination. See id. 424, 215 N.E.2d at 124. 
Although it is unclear exactly why the court wished to avoid relying on the prior public 
use doctrine as the foundation of its holding, several reasons can be suggested. The 
opinion's lengthy discussion of the ambiguous, but fairly detailed, legislative history of 
the Authority's enabling statute (id. at 420 n.15, 215 N.E.2d at 122 n.15) implies that the 
court was itself unsure whether the Authority's elaborate resort plan was supported by 
sufficiently explicit legislation. If this was so, the court may have felt that striking down 
the statute as too vague would establish a standard of legislative specificity higher than 
it was willing to set for most prior public use cases. The court also may have wished to 
avoid pitting its judgment regarding land use policies directly against that of the 
legislature through the prior public use doctrine when it could invalidate the statute on 
other, less sensitive, grounds. Alternatively, it may have decided that using the doctrine 
as only one of several bases for its holding would detract from Gould's precedential value 
as a case in which public trust principles were carried out by means of prior public use. 
Therefore, the court may have considered it wiser to confine to dicta the disclosure of its 
intent to thwart the destruction of public trust resources through the doctrine of prior 
public use. 
204. 350 Mass. at 421, 215 N.E.2d at 123. For another case involving a challenge to the 
development of parkland based in part upon the proposed project's commercial nature, 
see Everett v. Metropolitan District Commission, 350 Mass. 575, 215 N.E.2d 763 (1966). 
This case centered around the erection of a high school athletic facility on land adjoining 
the Chestnut Hill Reservoir in Boston. The Metropolitan District Commission had been 
given statutory authorization to execute leases for the use of the facility with private 
parties. The plaintiffs alleged that the lease of the facility to private parties when it was 
not being used for educational activities would make it an unacceptably commercial 
enterprise. The court was unimpressed by this argument, however, and found the 
construction ofthe recreation center permissible under the existing enabling legislation. 
Id. at 380-81, 215 N.E.2d at 767. 
205. 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967). 
206. Act of Sept. 2, 1965, ch. 679, 1965 Mass. Acts 445, 446, incorporating by reference 
Act of Sept. 28, 1956, ch. 718, § 6, 1956 Mass. Acts 757, 766. The latter statute states in 
relevant part: "The department ... may, on behalf of the commonwealth, take by 
eminent domain under ... [G.L.c. 79] or acquire by purchase or otherwise, such public ... 
lands ... cemeteries, public parks or reservations, or parts thereof or rights therein ... as 
it may deem necessary." Act of Sept. 28, 1956, ch. 718, § 6 quoted in 352 Mass. at 672 n.4, 
227 N.E.2d at 479-80 n.4. 
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the Commonwealth's lands and authorizing it to improve those 
lands for the benefit of the state207 was specific enough to permit 
the proposed filling of the pond.208 The court emphasized that an 
agency's possession of broad discretionary powers does not 
exempt it from having to obtain explicit legislative authorization 
for projects affecting the use of public land within its control. 
"Where land devoted to a public purpose is concerned, specific 
statutory language is required."209 
Exactly what constituted specific statutory language, however, 
was not answered by Sacco. Furthermore, the differences in the 
scope of the statutes at issue in Sacco, Higginson, and Gould 
created uncertainty regarding future statutory requirements. 
Higginson and Gould had found fairly narrow and explicit enabl-
ing legislation insufficient, while Sacco had held inadequate a 
more general statute which granted the delegatee both broad 
powers and considerable discretion. The court therefore at-
tempted to clarify its expectations in Robbins v. Department of 
Public Works.:no Robbins is the Supreme Judicial Court's most 
definitive pronouncement to date on the prior public use doc-
trine's requirements of statutory specificity when public trust 
land is at stake. 
The court recognized that the legislation at issue in Robbins211 
accorded the Department of Public Works far less power and 
discretion than it had been given by the Sacco statutes,212 and 
that it was therefore less likely that the agency had abused its 
privileges in this instance. Nevertheless, the court found the stat-
207. This Act provides that "[t]he department shall ... have charge oft.he lands, rights 
in lands ... belonging to the commonwealth, and shall ... ascertain what portions of such 
lands may be ... improved with benefit to the commonwealth." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 91, § 2 (West 1969), quoted in 352 Mass. at 673 n.5, 227 N.E.2d at 480 n.;). 
208. 352 Mass. at 673, 227 N.E.2d at 480. 
209. Id. (emphasis in original). 
210. 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969). 
211. The statute in controversy, states in material part: "A commissioner ... having 
control of any land of the commonwealth may, ... subject to the approval ofthe governor 
and council ... transfer to the control of another state department ... such land as may 
be necessary for the laying out or relocation of any highway." MASS. GgN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 30 § 44A (West 1969), quoted in 355 Mass. at 331 n.2, 244 N.E.2d at 579 n.2. 
212. MASS. GgN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30 § 44A (West 1969) (quoted supra note 211), unlike 
Act of Sept. 28, 1956, ch. 718, § 6, 1956 Mass. Acts 757, 766, (quoted supra note 206) did not 
grant the Department the power of eminent domain. Furthermore, it involved only land 
owned by the Commonwealth, and related only to the construction or relocation of 
highways. Finally, any transfer made under its auspices required the approval of other 
state authorities. 355 Mass. at 331, 244 N.E.2d at 579-80. 
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ute inadequate to permit the construction of a highway inter-
change on a tract of wetlands. A mere check on administrative 
discretion, such as that provided by the enabling statute's re-
quirement of approval from the governor and council, could not 
compensate for a lack of specificity where land of extraordinary 
public worth was concerned.213 As for what constituted adequate 
specificity, the court declared that before "parklands, Great 
Ponds, reservations and kindred areas" could be devoted to an 
inconsistent public use, the Legislature must identify the land, 
state the new use, and in some way demonstrate "legislative 
awareness of the existing public use."214 "In short," the court 
concluded, "the legislation should express not merely the public 
will for the new use, but its willingness to surrender or forego the 
existing use."215 
Shortly after establishing the three-pronged test of legislative 
specificity in Robbins, the court invoked it to invalidate two other 
proposed development projects. In Brookline v. Metropolitan Dis-
trict Commission,216 the court prevented the Commission's taking 
of parkland from the town of Brookline for the reconstruction of a 
roadway because the relevant enabling legislation did not spe-
cifically identify the land to be appropriated.217 Similarly, the court 
forestalled the construction of an airport runway through 
Martha's Vineyard State Forest in Abbot v. Commissioners of 
Dukes County.218 Although the Commissioners already held an 
easement for air navigation over some of the land and a deed to 
another parcel in the reserve, the court found that they had never 
received permission from the Legislature to use their property 
rights in a manner inconsistent with the present use of the land 
as a state forest.219 
Despite the heightened standard of specificity to which the 
court has traditionally held change-in-use statutes affecting pub-
lic trust land, it has not always found such legislation to be 
inadequate, as two pre-Robbins decisions indicate. In Appleton v. 
Massachusetts Parking Authority,220 the court approved of the 
213. See 355 Mass. at 331, 244 N.E.2d at 580. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. 357 Mass. 435, 258 N.E.2d 284 (1970). 
217. Id. at 441, 258 N.E.2d at 287. 
218. 357 Mass. 784, 260 N.E.2d 142 (1970). 
219. Id. at 785, 260 N.E.2d at 143. 
220. 340 Mass. 303, 164 N.E.2d 137 (1960). 
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defendant's plans to build a parking garage under the Boston 
Common after it found the Authority's enabling statute 
sufficiently specific to permit the limited taking which the Au-
thority proposed. The court cautioned, however, that the relevant 
legislation was not "a roving eminent domain provision which 
could be used to take as yet unspecified substantial portions of the 
Common and the Public Garden."221 In Trustees of Reservations v. 
Stockbridge,222 the town of Stockbridge, in order to eonstruct a 
public high school, wished to take half of N aumkeag, a historic 
preserve possessing expansive views and unusual gardens. The 
court upheld the taking after examining the highly explicit legis-
lation from which the town drew its authority.223 
The more recent Opinion of the Justices224 is the only case since 
Robbins in which the court has found change-in-use legislation 
explicit enough to accomplish its aim. In that case, the court 
advised that the proposed legislation permitting the elimination 
of the public's interest in Boston tidelands adequately fulfilled 
Robbins' three-pronged requirement of identifying the property, 
recognizing the public interests which will be foreclosed, and 
articulating the land's new use.225 In fact, the bill identified the 
land affected only generally as "tidelands within the city of Bos-
ton lying seaward of the 1980 Line,"226 and both the existing and 
the proposed uses were described as any "public purpose,"227 
which the bill's author had defined to encompass virtually any 
lawful activity.228 Finally, the significance of the public's current 
interests in the land under consideration was to be assessed not 
by the Legislature, but by the Secretary of Environmental M-
fairs.229 The court's approval of these provisions appears to be a 
substantial departure from its stringency in Robbins. The deci-
sion, however, was not an unreasonable one, given that much of 
the area covered by the proposed provisions, although technically 
subject to the public trust, was already commercially developed, 
and therefore of little value to the general public.230 
221. Id. at 310, 164 N.E.2d at 141. 
222. 348 Mass. 511, 204 N.E.2d 463 (1965). 
223. See id. at 13 n.2, 204 N.E.2d at 465 nA. 
224. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1361, 424 N .E.2d 1092. For further discussion of this case, see 
supra text at notes 92-99. 
225. Id. at 1386, 424 N.E.2d at 1108. 
226. S. 1001, § 4 (1981). 
227. Id. at § 3. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at § 4. 
230. See map reproduced in 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1388, 424 N.E.2d at 1109. 
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The willingness which the court showed in this case to relax the 
standards of the Robbins criteria in appropriate instances was 
foreshadowed by two earlier opinions of lower authorities. In a 
1978 opinion, the Attorney General advised that the three Rob-
bins criteria could be satisfied essentially through implication.231 
The question posed to the Attorney General involved the ade-
quacy of a statute232 authorizing the transfer of part of a park on 
Gooseberry Neck in Westport (the specific tract to be chosen by 
the transferee) from the Department of Environmental Man-
agement (DEM) to the Southern Massachusetts Technological 
Institute for the construction of an oceanographic experimental 
station. The Attorney General concluded, first, that Robbins did 
not prohibit the delegation of the duty to designate the particular 
parcel to be transferred as long as the eligible land was properly 
identified.233 Second, he decided that the Robbins requirement of 
showing legislative awareness of the existing use was fulfilled by 
the General Court's recognition that the land was owned by DEM. 
"Given the limited uses for which DEM could own land ... the 
Legislature's awareness that [Gooseberry Neck] land was owned 
by DEM implies a general knowledge that the land was used for 
recreation and conservation purposes at the time."234 
Two years later, in Newburyport Redevelopment Authority v. 
Commonwealth,235 the Appeals Court upheld a conversion of 
public land from a city park to a city parking lot on the basis of a 
statute which identified the parkland's new use only as "such 
municipal purposes as [the city] may from time to time deter-
mine."236 Although the Robbins court might not have endorsed 
such a decision, the Newburyport court was undoubtedly 
influenced by the fact that, at the time the case arose, the park 
had already been used as a parking lot for several years.237 
A realistic judicial appraisal of the value which the citizenry 
places on any piece of public land is essential to maintaining the 
integrity of both the doctrines of public trust and prior public use. 
Therefore, loosening the standards for the Robbins criteria as the 
231. 1977/78 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 23, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 128, 131 (1978). 
232. Act of Aug. 7, 1969, ch. 648, § 1, 1969 Mass. Acts 489, cited in id. 
233. 1977178 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 23, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 128, 131 (1978). 
234. Id. at 132. 
235. 9 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 401 N.E.2d 118 (1980). 
236. Act of Feb. 18, 1960, ch. 94, 1960 Mass. Acts 50, quoted in id. at 222, 242, 401 N.E.2d 
at 132, 143. 
237. See 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 222, 401 N.E.2d at 132. 
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case requires neither undermines Robbins' doctrinal validity nor 
runs afoul of public trust principles which mandate an individual 
assessment of the public importance of certain land. The Massa-
chusetts courts remain free to reign in the Legislature or its 
delegates by applying the Robbins criteria stringently whenever 
the situation so demands. 
The implementation of public trust concepts through the prior 
public use doctrine, as,developed in the line of cases discussed,238 
is a creative and generally effective judicial technique. By choos-
ing to introduce public trust principles into land use law through 
a well-established doctrine which, like the public trust doctrine 
itself, focuses on the uses of land and acts defensively to protect 
existing uses, the court has been able to carry out public trust's 
essential purpose, which is the preservation of land whose charac-
teristics make it especially valuable and useful to the general 
public. 
In order to carry out the public trust doctrine's primary aim, 
courts have traditionally applied it to governmental, as well as 
private, actions which infringe on public uses. It has also been 
accorded flexibility in order to meet the changing needs of the 
public.239 Without its broad applicability and flexibility, the public 
trust doctrine would offer the public little protection. The Su-
preme Judicial Court wisely recognized this fact and ensured the 
public trust's effectiveness in protecting nonsubmerged public 
lands by grafting it onto a preexisting doctrine which applied 
primarily to land transfers between public entities, and which 
allowed the Legislature, under certain conditions, to redefine land 
use priorities. 
Prior public use's applicability to governmentally instigated 
alterations in land use permits the judiciary to police those 
changes which are brought about in furtherance of legitimate, 
238. See supra text at notes 152-92. 
239. As Joseph Sax has noted: 
It is unreasonable to view the public trust as simply a problem of alienation of 
publicly owned property into private hands, since many if not most of the 
depredations of public resources are brought about by public authorities who 
have received the permission of the state to proceed with their schemes. On the 
other hand, it is inconceivable that the trust doctrine should be viewed as a rigid 
prohibition, preventing all dispositions of trust property or utterly f:reezing as of 
a given moment the uses to which those properties have traditionally been put. 
It can hardly be the basis for any sensible legal doctrine that change itself is 
illegitimate. 
Sax, Shackles, supra note 20, at 186. 
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but destabilizing, public purposes. Because prior public use per-
mits changes to be made pursuant to explicit legislation, however, 
the public trust doctrine is able to be as flexible on land as it has 
always been in water. Furthermore, the Robbins requirement 
that the Legislature articulate the public use to which public trust 
land is presently subject ensures that the Legislature has recog-
nized and heeded the interests of the general public, and not only 
those of special interest groupS.240 
The Supreme Judicial Court has found prior public use to be 
such an effective vehicle for public trust that the former may 
eventually usurp the latter. In Opinion of the Justices, 241 the court 
cited the Robbins criteria as a primary restriction on the Legisla-
ture's ability to free submerged lands from the public trust with 
which they are impressed.242 Its reliance on Robbins in this case is 
perhaps the greatest possible tribute to the appropriateness of 
the prior public use doctrine as a means of implementing public 
trust. Opinion of the Justices concerned Boston's foreshore, pre-
cisely the type of land to which the public trust doctrine has 
traditionally applied. There was no apparent reason for the court 
to implement public trust through the mechanism of another 
doctrine other than its belief that the principles of prior public use 
provided the wisest and most fitting means of enforcing the public 
trust. Thus, the court, in Opinion of the Justices, brought public 
trust full circle; in grappling with the doctrinal confusion which it 
had created in its Boston Waterfront decision concerning the 
alienability of submerged lands,243 it clung to the simplicity of the 
device it had initially fashioned for bringing public trust out of the 
water and onto the land.244 
Opinion of the Justices was not the first time that principles of 
prior public use had been recognized as more than merely a 
convenient way for the courts to use public trust concepts without 
drastically expanding the scope of that doctrine. The stature of 
240. See Sax, supra note 19, at 498, 502. 
241. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1361,424 N.E.2d 1092. For further discussion of this case, see 
supra text at notes 92-99. 
242. [d. at 1371, 424 N.E.2d at 1100. 
243. 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979). For a discussion ofthis case, see supra text at 
notes 78-88. 
244. Although no previous case substituted prior public use for public trust in tide-
lands as explicitly as did Opinion of the Justices, there are several older decisions, 
concerning the obstruction of watercourses, which draw upon elements of both. See 
Quincy v. Boston, 148 Mass. 389, 19 N.E. 519 (1889); Marblehead v. County Comm'rs of 
Essex, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 451 (1855); Kean v. Stetson, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 492 (1827). 
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the prior public use doctrine as a means of ensuring the responsi-
ble use of public lands also received attention from the Legislature, 
which incorporated it, in somewhat varied form, in its amendment 
of the "conservation" provision of the Massachusetts constitution. 
Because this amendment contains elements of both prior public 
use and public trust, it is worthwhile to compare the scope of the 
constitutional codification with that of each of these common law 
doctrines. 
3. Article 97: the Codification of a Hybrid 
Massachusetts first enacted a constitutional provision for the 
protection of its natural resources in 1918.245 In 1972, the state 
annulled this amendment and replaced it with a new one which 
described the public's environmental rights in greater detail and 
provided additional protection for land already devoted to conser-
vation purposes. This enactment, known as Article of Amend-
ment Ninety-seven, states: 
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, 
freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and natural 
scenic historic and esthetic qualities of their environment; 
and the protection of the people in their right to the conser-
vation, development and utilization of the agricultural, min-
eral, forest, water, air and other natural resources is hereby 
declared to be a public purpose. 
The general court shall have the power to enact legislation 
necessary or expedient to protect such rights. 
In furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general court 
shall have the power to provide for the taking, upon payment 
of just compensation therefor, or for the acquisition by pur-
chase or otherwise, of lands and easements or such other 
interests therein as may be deemed necessary to accomplish 
these purposes. 
Lands or easements taken or acquired for such purposes 
shall not be used for other purposes or otherwise disposed of 
245. This provision provided: 
The conservation, development and utilization of the agricultural, mineral, 
forest, water and other natural resources of the commonwealth are public uses, 
and the general court shall have power to provide for the taking, upon payment 
of just compensation therefor, of lands and easement or interests therein, 
including water and mineral rights, for the purpose of securing and promoting 
the proper conservation, development, utilization and control thereof and to 
enact legislation necessary or expedient therefor. 
Mass. Con st. Art. of Amend. Forty-Nine (1918, annulled 1972). 
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except by laws enacted by a two thirds vote, taken by yeas or 
nays, of each branch of the general court.246 
887 
The first paragraph of the amendment proclaims the public's 
right to several environmental elements basic to the health and 
welfare of society. Thus, its premise is strikingly similar to that of 
the public trust doctrine which protects resources used by the 
general public for activities of social importance. The Article's 
second and third paragraphs merely pronounce the means by 
which the enumerated rights may be enforced; the last paragraph 
sets forth the method of disposing of property rights acquired 
pursuant to those means. The mechanism set out in the amend-
ment's final paragraph is plainly based on the prior public use 
doctrine's procedure for establishing priorities among conflicting 
public uses.247 Although the doctrine's requirement of explicit 
legislation was not included, a two-thirds vote by the General 
Court replaced the simple majority imposed by common law. 
Despite the basic similarities between the constitutional 
amendment and the doctrines of public trust and prior public use, 
Article 97 differs from both these common law precepts in several 
significant ways. The foremost of these is the subject of its focus. 
Article 97, it has been noted, "seeks to prevent government from 
ill-considered misuse or other disposition of public lands and 
interests held for conservation, development, or utilization of 
natural resources."248 Thus, it concentrates primarily on preser-
vation of natural resources rather than on preservation of exist-
ing public uses. This distinction is extremely important, because it 
explains why the amendment does not simply codify, and there-
fore usurp, the doctrines of public trust and prior public use. 
Nevertheless, the coverage of the three may frequently overlap. 
The precise scope of Article 97 and the meaning of its terms 
relative to those of the prior public use and public trust doctrines 
have been considered once by the Supreme Judicial Court,249 once 
246. MASS. CONST. Art. of Amend. Ninety-Seven (1972, superseding Art. of Amend. 
Forty-Nine). See supra note 245. For a thorough analysis ofthe effect ofthis amendment, 
a comparison of its provisions with those of similar pieces oflegislation from other states, 
and a discussion of alternative provisions for the amendment which were never enacted, 
see P. DONOVAN, REPORT: PRESERVATION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, H.R. Doc. 
No. 5301 (1971). 
247. See 1972173 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 45, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 139, 144-46 (1973). 
248. Id. at 148. 
249. Opinion of the Justices, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1361,424 N.E.2d 1092. 
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by the Appeals Court,250 and a number of times by the Attorney 
Genera1.251 These decisions draw several other noteworthy dis-
tinctions between the amendment and its common law forebears. 
In some respects, the amendment is more narrow in scope than 
the common law doctrines. First, Article 97's two-thirds vote re-
quirement protects only those public interests which rise to the 
status of "lands or easements."252 The Supreme Judicial Court, in 
Opinion of the Justices,253 therefore advised that a two-thirds vote 
of the Legislature is not required to alienate the public's interest in 
tidelands or submerged lands, because the public's rights in such 
aquatic resources are generally lesser property interests than 
either "lands or easements."254 Thus, the amendment is less ex-
tensive than the common law doctrines, both of which protect 
uses to which public land is put, regardless of the status of those 
uses under property law. Second, Article 97's change-in-use provi-
sion pertains only to land taken or acquired for certain enumer-
ated conservation-related purposes, while the common law doc-
trine of prior public use applies to any publicly held land regard-
less of the purpose for which it was acquired.255 Recognition of this 
difference caused the Attorney General to conclude that undevel-
oped land taken by the Massachusetts Port. Authority for airport 
purposes could be transferred to the Metropolitan District Com-
mission and used for conservation and recreational purposes 
without the approval of two-thirds of the Legislature, but not 
without explicit statutory authorization.256 
In one respect, however, the amendment is more eomprehen-
sive than either of the doctrines whose elements it incorporates. 
The Attorney General has construed the term "disposed of" in 
Article 97 to include "any transfer, without limitation, of either 
the legal interest in the acquired land or physical control over 
250. Newburyport Redevelopment Auth. v. Commonwealth, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 401 
N.E.2d 118 (1980). 
251. 1980/81 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 16, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 143 (1981); 1979/80 Op. 
Att'y Gen. No. 15, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 129 (1980); 1977178 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 23, 
Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 128 (1978); 1975176 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61, Rep. A.G., Pub. 
Doc. No. 12 at 157 (1976); 1972173 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 45, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 139 
(1973). 
252. See text of Art. of Amend. Ninety-Seven, supra text at note 246. 
253. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1361, 424 N.E.2d 1092. 
254. Id. at 1385, 424 N.E.2d at 1107. 
255. 1975176 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 157, 158-59 (1976). 
256. Id. 
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it."257 Therefore, a two-thirds vote by the General Court is re-' 
quired to effect a transfer of land between governmental entities, 
even when no change in the use of the land is contemplated.258 
Because both the doctrines of prior public use and public trust 
focus on changes in use rather than on changes in the controlling 
public entity, they do not apply to this situation. 
In another respect, Article 97 is broader than the prior public 
use doctrine, but coextensive with the doctrine of public trust. 
Article 97 covers transfers of land from public to private control, a 
situation to which, the Attorney General has noted, the prior 
public use doctrine "has not yet been applied."259 The prior public 
use doctrine has not been applied to public-private land transfers 
because it is inappropriate in that context, having originated 
primarily as a means of judicial "buck passing" when the courts 
were confronted with legislative delegates' conflicting claims of 
control over public land.260 The prior public use doctrine does not 
address the legislature's conveyance of public land to private 
parties. 
Principles of public trust, on the other hand, do apply to this 
situation. In fact, they may be more vital to the protection of the 
public interest in the context of public-private land transfers than 
in any other. Because the public trust doctrine is concerned with 
alterations in use rather than transfers of ownership, it is not 
activated solely by a shift in the public body controlling trust land. 
Such change, however, cannot be compared with a transfer of 
control from a public to a private entity. The public trust doctrine 
is indifferent to shifts in ownership between governmental bodies 
because land managed by any such body, in its public capacity, 
remains under the auspices of the sovereign which may dictate 
the uses to which that land is pUt.261 An unrestricted conveyance 
to a private party is another matter, however, because it extin-
guishes the sovereign's right to exert direct control over the use of 
the land,262 and automatically permits exclusion of the public. 
Because the legal right to alter land's use cannot logically be 
257. 1979/80 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 15, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 129, 132 (1980). See 
al8o, 1972/73 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 45, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 139, 144 (1973). 
258. 1972173 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 45, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 139, 148 (1973). 
259. [d. at 146. 
260. See 8upra text at notes 133-42. 
261. See 1 P. NICHOLS, 8upra note 12, § 2.225[1], at 155 (1981). 
262. Of course, the sovereign may still exert control over the land through its police 
power. 
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distinguished from the physical acts of doing so, the safety checks 
imposed by the public trust doctrine are at least as applicable to a 
transfer of land from public to private control as a transfer from 
one public use to another.263 
Thus, the doctrines of prior public use and public trust part 
company on the issue of public to private land transfers. The 
Supreme Judicial Court has generally been unwilling to stretch 
the prior public use doctrine to encompass this type of transac-
tion.264 This is not surprising, since the court apparently adopted 
prior public use as a means of implementing notions of public 
trust because of its reluctance to expand the public trust doctrine 
beyond the scope of its origins. Nevertheless, the court's hesitancy 
to apply the prior public use doctrine to real estate exchanges 
between public and private parties deprives the public trust doc-
trine of its traditional vehicle in such situations. Article 97 may 
prove to be a valuable means of implementing notions of public 
trust in cases like these to which prior public use does not apply. 
Article 97 may not be useful in all such instances, since it 
applies only to property interests taken or acquired for certain 
conservation purposes.265 Even in situations which fall outside the 
scope of both the prior public use doctrine and Article 97, however, 
the court is unlikely to be at a loss for mechanisms with which to 
carry out public trust concepts. The following cases illustrate two 
other legal tools which the court has employed. 
B. When Prior Public Use Fails: Other Vehicles for the 
Implementation of Public Trust Principles 
Article 97266 mandates a supermajority vote of the legislature 
to authorize the sale of certain types of public land to private 
263. This fact was demonstrated by the Gould court's hostility toward the commercial 
nature of the management agreement between the Mount Greylock Tramway Authority 
and the private development company, American Resort Services, Inc., which placed 
primary control over placing public lands in private hands. See supr£~ text at notes 
175-78. 
264. See infra text at notes 267-73. However, the Supreme Judicial Court's hesitancy to 
apply prior public use to public-private land transfers may be disappearing. See Opinion 
of the Justices, 1981 Mass: Adv. Sh. 1361,424 N.E.2d 1092. The legislation under scrutiny 
in that case, which was judged according to prior public use criteria, authorized the 
transfer of the state's interest in submerged lands to private parties. See supra text at 
notes 224-30. The Appeals Court has already expressed its willingness to apply the prior 
public use doctrine to property transactions between public and private parties. See Toro 
v. Revere, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 809, 401 N.E.2d 853 (1980); Muir v. Leominster, 2 Mass. App. 
Ct. 587, 317 N.E.2d 212 (1974), discussed infra, text at notes 278-96. 
265. See supra text at note 255. 
266. Quoted supra, text at note 246. 
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parties. Prior to its passage, however, the Supreme Judicial Court, 
in at least two cases involving a proposed transfer of land from 
public to private hands, brought to bear public trust consid-
erations through two common legal mechanisms: judicial review 
and statutory interpretation. 
In Loomis v. Boston,267 the court upheld the legislature's sale of 
city parkland to Sears, Roebuck & Co. for the construction of a 
parking lot. Although it directed its attention to determining 
whether the Legislature had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in 
authorizing the sale, the court implicitly passed judgment on the 
extent of the public's interest in the land and found the land not 
subject to the public trust. It noted as significant the trial court's 
findings that the area" 'was not landscaped and continued to 
have a barren appearance' "268 despite its designation as a park 
more than fifty years earlier, and that" 'extensive park land in 
the immediate area [was] available for the use of the public.' "269 
Therefore, it declared the authorizing statute neither arbitrary 
nor capricious, by which it apparently meant that the legislation 
was adequate to relinquish the public's limited interest in the 
land. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted both the precision 
of the statute,270 and its requirement that the city's board of park 
commissioners, its council, and its mayor all consent to the sale. 
In a second Supreme Judicial Court case involving a proposed 
land transfer between public and private entities, Jacobson v. 
Parks and Recreation Commission of Boston,271 the court decided 
that even the approval of the city council and the mayor was 
insufficient to legitimize the park commission's sale of 64,000 
square feet of parkland for the construction of an apartment 
building. The court avoided pronouncing the authorizing statute 
itself inadequate, however, by interpreting it in a way that in-
stead rendered deficient the actions of the board of park commis-
sioners. The statute in question permitted the. commission to sell 
any land placed under its control, on the condition that the "board 
... use the proceeds thereof in payment for any lands taken for 
park purposes under this act."272 The court interpreted this to 
267. 331 Mass. 129, 117 N.E.2d 539 (1954). 
268. Id. at 131, 117 N.E.2d at 540. 
269. Id. 
270. Act of April 3, 1951, ch. 199, 1951 Mass. Acts 158, quoted in id. at 130 n.1, 117 N.E.2d 
at 540 n.2. 
271. 345 Mass. 641, 189 N.E.2d 199 (1963). 
272. Act of April 5, 1899, ch. 274, § 3, 1899 Mass. Acts 238, 239, quoted in id. at 643, 189 
N.E.2d at 202. 
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mean that the board could not carry out the proposed sale until it 
had located appropriate land to purchase with the proceeds of 
that transaction. It pragmatically concluded that reserving the 
sale's proceeds for the purchase of another park was an inade-
quate solution, because an opportunity to replace the land might 
never arise.273 Thus, the court preserved the public's interest in 
the park without producing any distortion of the prior public use 
doctrine. 
As these cases demonstrate, the court has persisted in applying 
public trust principles to land use law in cases involving public-
to-private land transfers even without the aid of the prior public 
use doctrine. It is noteworthy, however, that the judicial mecha-
nisms discussed in this article for adapting public trust to land 
law, namely, the prior public use doctrine, judicial review, and 
statutory interpretation, have all involved some form of analysis 
of legislative action. Regardless of the particular legal tool 
through which the Massachusetts judiciary has implemented 
public trust concepts, it has always relied on legislative decision-
making as a means of safeguarding existing public uses as well as 
providing an avenue for the responsible alteration of those uses. 
This reliance creates a thorny problem: what mechanism can the 
courts use to protect land which appears to be impressed with the 
public trust but which is not subject to the legislature's jurisdic-
tion? 
This difficulty is peculiar to land law, where public trust princi-
ples are pitted directly against concepts of private property. It 
never arises where notions of public trust are applied to sub-
merged land because the state holds all navigable waters in trust 
for the people, and the only subject of dispute is how the state 
may best carry out its duties as trustee.274 The situation becomes 
more complex, however, when public trust principles are applied 
to upland areas, where public trust land must be identified before 
the state's responsibilities as trustee of such land can be de-
lineated. The identification of public trust land can be divided into 
two steps. One step, which has already been discussed,275 involves 
273. 345 Mass. at 646, 189 N.E.2d at 203. 
274. This was the central point of controversy in Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387 
(1892), discussed supra text at notes 37-50 and in Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629,393 N.E.2d 356 (1979); Opinion of the Justices, 1981 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1361,424 N.E.2d 1092; United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. 
Mass. 1981). These cases are discussed supra text at notes 78-106. 
275. See supra text at notes 156-93. 
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recognizing the existence of nonrestrictive public uses or physical 
characteristics which make the land particularly valuable to the 
public. The mere presence of such factors, however, is not 
sufficient to render land subject to the public trust; the control-
ling governmental entity must also own the parcel in its public, 
rather than its private, capacity.276 If land is not legally public, it 
cannot be subjected to legislative control. Thus, private property 
law may be the greatest obstacle to moving the public trust 
doctrine inland. 
Governmental bodies' ability to hold property privately may 
create situations in which land exhibits public trust characteris-
tics even though it is not publicly owned. Although such a case 
has never come before the Supreme Judicial Court, an issue of 
this sort was raised in the 1974 Appeals Court case of Muir v. 
Leominster.277 An examination of Muir is worthwhile because it 
exemplifies the complicated conflict between the values of public 
trust and those of private property. Furthermore, it provides a 
framework for speculation about whether the public's interests 
can still be protected in such a situation. 
C. Muir v. Leominster: The Limits of Public Trust? 
Muir v. Leominster,278 like Jacobson v. Parks and Recreation 
Commission of Boston,279 involved a citizen's suit to void the sale 
of a tract of parkland to a commercial developer. At issue in Muir 
was an eight-acre parcel of land, called Whitney Field, which had 
been donated to the city of Leominster in 1935, free from any 
restrictions on its use. The city eventually constructed a swim-
ming pool and other recreational facilities on two acres, but re-
tained the rest of the tract as "an open green spot."280 For thirty-
five years, most of Whitney Field was used for recreational pur-
poses such as "hiking, winter sliding, nature walks and picnick-
ing."281 Then, in 1970, the city voted to sell six acres of the Field for 
private development. 
The residents who sued to void the transaction plainly felt that 
the public's interest in the land had not received adequate consid-
276. For an explanation of the distinction between a governmental body's public and 
private character, see infra text at notes 288-93. 
277. 2 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 317 N.E.2d 212 (1974). 
278. ld. 
279. 345 Mass. 641, 189 N.E.2d 199 (1963), discussed supra text at notes 271-293. 
280. 2 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 589, 317 N.E.2d 212, 214 (1974). 
281. ld. 
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eration. They maintained, therefore, that the prior public use 
doctrine invalidated the transfer because the city had failed to 
procure the requisite legislative authorization.282 The Appeals 
Court rejected this contention, and upheld the conveyance. It may 
have reached this decision in part because it considered the evi-
dence concerning the land's value to the public insufficient to 
merit finding the land impressed with the public trust. Although 
the land had been made available to the public for thirty-five 
years, vandalism forced the closing of its recreational facilities 
around 1965.283 Furthermore, the petitioners were unable to 
prove that the public had made any significant use of the remain-
ing area during the years preceding the suit.284 
The weight of the evidence, however, was not the only basis for 
the decision. The opinion indicates that the court was grappling 
with the more perplexing problem of weighing the public's needs 
and expectations against a municipality's right to exercise exclu-
sive control over land which a private citizen had placed in its 
keeping. The Muir court determined that the scales tipped in 
favor of the town. 
The manner in which the Appeals Court arrived at its conclu-
sion merits special attention. It first determined that the prior 
public use doctrine did not pertain to the fact situation presented 
by Muir. The court did not, however, base this decision on the 
doctrine's inapplicability to conveyances between governmental 
entities and private parties.285 Instead, it determined that the 
prior public use doctrine applies "only to those lands which are in 
fact 'devoted to one public use.' "286 Whitney Field could not fulfill 
this condition because it had been given to the city by means of a 
deed which had placed no conditions on the use of the land.287 
282. Id. at 691, 317 N.E.2d at 216. 
283. Id. at 689, 317 N.E.2d at 214. 
284. Telephone interview with Thomas B. Arnold, attorney for the petitioners (J an. 14, 
1983). 
286. See 2 Mass. App. Ct. at 691, 317 N.E.2d at 216; See also supra text at notes 269-60. 
286. Id., quoting Robbins v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 366 Mass. 328,330,244 N.E.2d 677, 679 
(1969). In a footnote the court continued: 
The use of the phrase 'parklands, Great Ponds, reservations and kindred areas' 
in Robbins v. Department of Public Works, supra, at 331 ... is not helpful to the 
petitioners as it was apparently intended to include only other types of areas 
which the Legislature has specifically identified with or restricted to a particu-
lar public use. 
2 Mass. App. Ct. at 692 n.1, 317 N.E.2d at 216 n.l. 
287. The court elaborated on this point in the following manner: 
In this case there had been neither prior legislative authorization of a taking for 
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Through this rather inarticulate reasoning, the court intended to 
point out that Leominster held the land in its proprietary capac-
ity rather than its public capacity. This double nature of munici-
pal and state authority merits elaboration because it lies at the 
heart of the Muir decision. 
In its public capacity, a municipality serves as an agent of the 
sovereign, helping to perform those governmental activities 
which benefit the public as a whole. These may include holding 
general elections, suppressing crime, constructing highways,288 
and creating recreation areas.289 In its private capacity, however, 
a municipality acts as a private corporation on behalf of its own 
residents.290 The construction of libraries, the laying out of 
cemetaries, and the establishment of water supply systems are all 
functions which a town may perform in its character as a private 
corporation.291 The public-private distinction is important because 
the degree of control which the sovereign may exercise over 
certain municipal land depends upon the capacity in which the 
city holds the property. Without paying a town the value of the 
land or obtaining its consent, the state may require the town to 
transfer its publicly-held property to another governmental en-
tity or to use it for different purposes.292 The state, however, must 
treat a municipality's privately-held land as it would any other 
private property. It can only assume direct control of such land 
through its power of eminent domain, which requires payment of 
just compensation.293 
In Muir, the grantor's unrestricted conveyance of Whitney 
a particular public purpose nor a prior public or private grant restricted to a 
particular public purpose. The deed through which the city acquired title to the 
property was an unrestricted deed, not a limited grant for a particular use or 
purpose. There was no formal dedication by the city of this -area as a park land. 
Id. at 591-92, 317 N.E.2d at 215. 
288. 1 P. NICHOUl, supra note 12, § 2.225 [1], at 155 (1981). 
289. Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 79 N.E.2d 713, appeal dismissed sub. nom.; 
McCarthy v. Boston, 335 U.S. 849 (1948); Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 
99 N.E. 523 (1912). 
290. 1 P. NICHOUl, supra note 12, § 2.225[1], at 155 (1981). 
291. Id; 2 P. NICHOUl, supra note 12, § 5.50[6] (1982); Proprietors of Mount Hope 
Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 519, 33 N.E. 695, 698 (1893). 
292. 1 P. NICHOUl, supra note 12, § 2.225 [1], at 155 (1981); Cambridge v. Comm'r of Pub. 
Welfare, 357 Mass. 183, 186,257 N.E.2d 782, 785 (1970); Worcester v. Commonwealth, 345 
Mass. 99, 100, 185 N.E.2d 633, 634 (1962); Burnes v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 325 Mass. 
731, 735, 92 N.E.2d 381, 383 (1950). 
293. 1 P. NICHOUl, supra note 12, § 2.225 [1], at 158 (1981); 2 P. NICHOUl, supra note 12, § 
5.50[6], at 557 (1982); Cambridge v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 357 Mass. 183, 186,257 N.E.2d 
782, 785 (1970). 
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Field allowed Leominster to devote the property to any public or 
private purpose. It chose to use the land as a park, which has 
always been considered a public use in Massachusetts.294 The 
Appeals Court, however, may have felt that applying the prior 
public use doctrine to Whitney Field would have been tantamount 
to declaring that Leominster held the Field in its public capacity. 
Such a statement would have effectively deprived the town of 
both the value of its gift and its exclusive control over the land.295 
Furthermore, the court was aware that Leominster had never 
expressly dedicated Whitney Field to the public domain.296 Thus, 
the court reached a rather paradoxical result. In order to avoid 
penalizing the town for having made its open land publicly avail-
able, the court granted the town the right to extinguish the 
public's interest in the property at will. The Muir court concluded 
that public expectations, no matter how well established, are 
secondary to the rights of private ownership. Clearly, this decision 
is a setback to the expansion of public trust principles in inland 
areas. 
Because Muirs fact situation was not particularly unique, cases 
similar to it may arise in the future. Therefore, it is worth consid-
ering whether such a case could be decided differently, were one 
to reach the Supreme Judicial Court. First, it may be argued that 
a governmental entity's proprietary rights should never take 
precedence over the public's interest, and that the Muir court 
misbalanced the equities of the case. A municipality is created by 
the legislature, which bestows on it all the powers which it may 
possess.297 Even in its private capacity, a municipality acts on 
behalf of its residents,298 who represent one segment of the gen-
eral public. A municipality has never been thought to possess the 
same degree of autonomy as a private individual or corporation.299 
In light of these compelling factors, why should a court, in any 
situation, favor a town's proprietary rights over the expectations 
of the public? The most likely answer is a pragmatic one. A town 
would probably hesitate before permitting any public use of its 
privately-held land if doing so were tantamount to donating that 
294. See sources cited supra at note 289. 
295. See supra text at note 292. 
296. 2 Mass. App. Ct. at 592, 317 N.E.2d at 215. 
297. Cambridge v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 357 Mass. 183, 185, 257 N.E.2d 782, 785 
(1970). 
298. See supra text at note 290-91. 
299. Agawam v. Hampden, 130 Mass. 528, 530 (1881). 
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land to the state. Thus, the judiciary, by wholeheartedly support-
ing the public's interest in a case like Muir, might do the public 
more harm than good. 
A reconciliation between the public's needs and a town's right 
to reap the benefits of private ownership appears to be the only 
sensible solution. There are two means by which the judiciary 
might accomplish this aim. It could adopt the proposal of one 
commentator who advocates declaring that all private property 
owners hold their lands' natural resources in trust for the benefit 
of the public.3°O According to this scheme, owners would be legally 
obligated to preserve and enhance the ecological value of their 
land. This notion could easily be extended to protect established 
public uses as well as natural resources. This solution, however, 
would hardly be practical for Massachusetts, where the judiciary 
has been unwilling to extend openly the public trust doctrine 
beyond its birthplace in submerged land.301 Since the Supreme 
Judicial Court will not apply public trust explicitly to public inland 
areas, it would certainly never expand the scope of that doctrine 
to encompass private property as well. 
The public's interest in maintaining access to municipal land 
might be better protected through the doctrine of implied dedica-
tion,302 which is based on the principle of estoppel. The policy 
reasons for preventing a party from dishonoring public uses to 
which he or she knowingly assented ought to apply even more 
strongly to an arm of the government, such as a municipality, 
than to a private individual, because citizens assume that their 
government acts for the public good. Although implied dedication 
would meet the public's interests, it would not necessarily satisfy 
the concerns of the town. Implied dedication would require the 
town to obtain legislative permission before altering the use of its 
land. Like express dedication, it would divest the town of its 
proprietary interest in the property and subject the land to the 
prior public use doctrine. Because implied dedication renders land 
public, this doctrine would also prevent the municipal owner from 
receiving compensation for its property, were the land to be sub-
sequently taken by the state.303 
This seemingly unavoidable inequity may continue to prevent 
300. R. APPLEGATE, PuBLIC TRUSTS: A NEW ApPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL PRo-
TECTION (1976). 
301. See supra text at notes 130. 
302. For a brief discussion of this doctrine, see supra note 127. 
303. See supra text at note 292. 
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Massachusetts courts from applying public trust principles to 
cases like Muir. The public's expectations might receive greater 
judicial attention if the General Court were to enact legislation 
compensating municipalities for the taking of land which they 
have voluntarily dedicated to the use of the general public. Had 
such legislation been in place when Muir was decided, the Appeal~ 
Court might have been willing to declare Whitney Field to be 
publicly-held land. Unless the legislature takes such action, how-
ever, the Muir case may continue to represent a public need 
which property law does not recognize and which public trust 
concepts cannot fulfill. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Increasingly, urban Americans are looking to their state or 
local government to provide them with open, undeveloped areas. 
As this dependency grows, so does the public's need for a legal tool 
with which to defend its interest in land which the government 
has made available to it. The public trust doctrine can serve this 
purpose. 
This doctrine developed under Roman law as a means of mak-
ing the sea and its shores freely available to the citizenry for the 
performance of all noninjurious activities. In somewhat restricted 
form, it later became part of English common law. American 
courts also made use of the doctrine and adapted it to fit the 
characteristics of the North American continent. 
Public trust has always been an important concept in the coast-
al law of Massachusetts. Although the Massachusetts Bay col-
onists, in an effort to promote wharfbuilding, granted much of the 
state's shoreline to private individuals, the doctrine still protects 
the public's right to use the sea itself. The degree of protection 
which the doctrine offers submerged land, however, is presently 
uncertain. Tlie legislature's ability to alienate public trust land, 
which has traditionally been unquestioned, has become the sub-
ject of recent debate in the state's courts. 
The public trust doctrine is as applicable to publicly-owned 
inland areas as it is to' coastal regions. Furthermore, its adapta-
tion to nonsubmerged land is particularly desirable, because no 
other doctrine of property law can adequately fulfill its purpose of 
protecting resources on which important public activities depend. 
Massachusetts courts have recognized the importance of adopt-
ing public trust principles into land use law. Although they have 
1984] PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 899 
not explicitly applied the public trust doctrine to non submerged 
land, the courts have carried out its purposes through other legal 
mechanisms. 
The primary vehicle for public trust in its inland context is the 
doctrine of prior public use, a principle of eminent domain law 
traditionally used to settle interagency land disputes. When pub-
lic trust is implemented through prior public use, however, no 
dispute is needed to invoke the latter doctrine's requirement of 
explicit legislation. Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court has 
formulated a heightened standard of specificity for legislation 
authorizing a change in the use of land exhibiting public trust 
characteristics. 
Because the purpose of the prior public use and public trust 
doctrines are not identical, prior public use is sometimes an inap-
propriate vehicle for public trust. In such cases, the courts can 
implement public trust principles through other legal mecha-
nisms, such as the "conservation" provision of the Massachusetts 
constitution, judicial review, and statutory interpretation. Be-
cause the public trust doctrine applies only to public property, 
however, there may be cases in which land exhibiting public trust 
characteristics is left without protection. This situation has aris-
en, and may continue to arise, when a municipality makes pub-
licly available undeveloped land which it owns in its proprietary 
capacity. Unfortunately, there appears to be no existing legal 
mechanism by which the courts can protect both the interests of 
the municipality and the public's right to access in such cases. 
